Lu:
What you say reinforces the need for test pilots (and FTEs) to be involved at the design stage. This was done extensively with the EH101 cockpit definition and also, I believe, with the MD900. There are doubtless many other examples.
But just because it's one way for civil operations doesn't mean that it shouldn't or can't be changed for military use. I have fair experience of customising off-the-shelf civil aircraft for military use: a deal of thought and work goes into subtle reconfigurations of instruments, switches and ancillary controls in the cockpit.
I contest the implication that military certification standards are more rigorous than civil standards: I've worked in both areas. Without looking through AC29-C (the FAA Certification Guide), I'm pretty sure you'll find the switchery and control protocols in there too, just as in Mil Stds.
Anyway, if it's wrong, then the operators air safety system should pick it up and generate change: but only if the problems are being reported. I'm sure we aviators often fall short in this area!
As to the Governor Auto/Manual switch on the 212 et al, it was explained to me once that gating the switch could waste precious nano-seconds in the event of an urgent need to operate the switch. Next question: What about an interlock microswitch, so moving the switch has no effect unless throttle fully closed? Well, was the answer, sometimes microswitches and interlocks fail....
I wonder whether statistically more engines have been trashed by inadvertent Gov switch operation than there have been incidents of needing to use the switch in anger: but I guess we know the answer. The best protection is still to proceed with caution and give those switches RESPECT! And, as in my previous post, it does help to configure the console so that the Hyd and Gov switches have some distance between them.