The fun bit of driving is that often the driver gets to make decisions under uncertainty... This has become a buzz word outside of aeronautical decision making, in financial, medical and nuclear sectors, being valid for situations where incomplete and inconsistent information exists and where there are temporal constraints. Add LEO's in critical incidents etc too.
In the warm-fuzzy training, aeronautical decision making, ADM gets a quick nod, as does SA theory, interspersed with PC matters. All good stuff, worth the coffee break. The simulator and classroom tend to be analogs of the real worked, the guys in seat 0L and 0R are those that are up close n' personal to the scenery, and have all the good and bad bits that flow from that.
Of all the types to have UAS on, the bussé is both the best and worst to have it, depending on how the system detects the fault. Being a C* control system the potential need to have to apply manual trim is a complication exacerbated by that being usually only encountered in sim sessions. Boeing's C*U system has the pilot re-indexing the "in trim" speed like a C-150... at all times, but still can be a bit messed up, but at least top get rid of sensors in the Boeing FBW system needs only one red guarded switch to be played with, not a series ELACs or EFCs (remembering that which specific ones you pull off line may cause a complication later...). The complete UAS though, gives the secondary speed display, assuming that the flock of canadian geese didn't take out all of your alpha probes at the same time. Anyway, point is, there are a number of oddities that come to light with P/S and AOA malfunctions, and often they take a moment or two to sort out, the underlying problems tending to be of a limited family of flavor, with special toppings.
Airbus ECAM-NNCL-OEB-AFM-NOTES/CAUTIONS WARNINGS and system descriptions are not renowned for their user friendly nature. If the guys kept the blue on the top, followed common sense to give themselves time to analysis, and followed procedures, and got confirmation of their analysis or input from engineering, and then operational confirmation of the companies preference in maintenance follow-on, don't see that there is much to get out of sorts over.
Birdstrikes happen, sometimes at really annoying times, (ask Sully, ask the B73 drivers on finals into Ciampino, ask the Nimrod crew @ Kinloss, etc) Other times, the systems are not adversely impacted. The drivers in this case would be aware of where the impact was and then promptly aware of the consequent anomaly to instrumentation. Pretty sure that if one side goes bad, it is discernible against the 2 other independent systems that exist. With the system recovering to anywhere near normal, not sure that doing a jettison to being forward a landing with exactly the same potential errors is going to be high up on the agenda of doors to choose from.
Interesting day out, crew done good, so did Ops control system and maint support on this occasion.
Decision Making under Uncertainty warm-fuzzies:
Orasanu, j., Ames, N., Martin, L., Davison, J.;Factors in Aviation Accidents: Decision Errors, Linking expertise and naturalistic decision making (2001)
Rhoda, D. , Pawlak, M.; An assessment of thunderstorm penetrations and deviations by commercial aircraft in the terminal area. Project Report NASA/A-2, 3, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory (1999)
Goh, J., Wiegmann, D.;Human factors analysis of accidents involving visual flight rules flight into adverse weather. Aviat. Space Environ. Med., 73 (8) (2002)
O'Hare, D., Smitheram, T;"Pressing on" into deteriorating conditions: An application of behavioral decision theory to pilot decision making. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol., 5 (4) (1995), pp. 351-370
Damasio, A.;Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. Grosset/Putnam, New York (1994)
Causse, M., Baracat, B., Pastor, J., Dehais, F., 2011a. Reward and Uncertainty Favor Risky Decision-Making in Pilots: Evidence from Cardiovascular and Oculometric Measurements. Appl. Psychophysiol. Biofeedback 36 (4), 231–242.
Causse, M., Dehais, F., Arexis, M., Pastor, J., 2011b. Cognitive aging and flight performances in general aviation pilots. Aging Neuropsychol. Cogn. 18 (5), 544–561.
Causse, M., Dehais, F., Pastor, J., 2011c. Executive functions and pilot characteristics predict flight simulator performance in general aviation pilots. Int. J. Aviat. Psychol. 21 (3), 217–234.