The roots of the ‘How Operators Can Create Safety in an Uncertain World’ are in a previous “
Defining Resilience’ article:-
https://flightsafety.org/asw-article...ng-resilience/
Th Aero Safety article retains the old view of safety opposed to a new view, Safety-II, and also divides resilience amongst individual/teams and the organisation, overlooking the important ‘system’, combined view.
Resilience is defined from a dictionary, organisational management view without correlation to aviation. (The subsequent article corrects that).
Many training aspects are already within CRM or EBT. The focus is on ‘safety events’ - risk, old safety, opposed to the adaptation required to continue to manage normal operations; thus a drift towards failure in examples.
‘
How Operators Can Create Safety in an Uncertain World’ lacks emphasis on the need and extent of change, quoting “… a move to support safety management”, “… not a wholesale change”; whereas other ‘Resilience’ and ‘Safety-II’ texts emphasise ‘a change from … to’, proposing a new way of thinking about safety management.
The text misrepresents the concept of a complex adaptive system; ‘expected events are not necessarily just ordered (complicated), nor all unexpected events complex - they are just unexpected.
Accepting uncertainty is important, but the emphasis on understanding complexity (can it ever be understood) detracts from the need support the human in adjusting to the uncertainties in normal operations, by understanding why normal operations succeed; the awareness, knowledge, choice of action. Seeking to achieve more of what goes right.
This document has value, if only as another view of the concept of Resilience which is difficult to comprehend and apply, but don't expect to be able to ‘create safety’ based on this, if ever.
However as a ‘foundational support document’, it appears to be misplaced by locating it within the ‘Learning from all operations’ initiative - more on that later.