The pilot’s experience on the aircraft and route flown should have been enough (in my view) to enable to the pilot to make, and be confident in making, the call to turn back/avoid or whatever..
I think that is what the Coroner was getting at with some of the comments. The ATSB included in findings/recommendations that more information to pilots should have been available, but in this case it would probably have not altered the outcome as the pilot was significantly experienced on the route and familiar with weather patterns. The same could be said of commercial pressure or 'encouragement', this pilot would most likely have known when to say no in most occasions except this one. The coroner seemed to think on evidence that it was a reasonable decision for the pilot to depart and follow the route they did on meteorological information available. And the part about a recording device, really, what sort of recording device are we talking about, they already know the flight path and attitudes at impact. Are we talking about a CVR in a single pilot aircraft just in case the pilot is talking to themselves, or are we talking video recordings, which has always been a big no-no among pilot groups. FDR and CVR will most likely not shed any more light on what happened, it definitely will not really show much in the way of weather outside reducing visibility, unless it was heavy rain or hail. Its nice to mention these things, but when do you stop before getting to the point that they say they need some form of 'time machine' so they can go back and watch what actually happened.
I think the critical aspect is focused on the 'Crash Investigation Report' being turned into a safety advisory and not focusing on the crash and it's actual cause, rather proceeding directly to identify deficiencies within the company not directly related to the accident.