https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/en...ffense-part-i/
ENDING THE IDEOLOGY OF THE OFFENSE, PART I
…..The ongoing war in Ukraine has shown that indications and warnings are a risky gauge on which to base decisions about the flow of forces into a theater. For Russia, whose deployment distance is stepping across a border, while the United States must cross an ocean and all of Western Europe, it is especially fraught. The Chinese advantage of proximity similarly creates challenges in defending Taiwan and elsewhere in the region.
These realities, coupled with the ever-growing threat to air bases and seaports from long-range precision fires, only complicate the getting-to-the-fight challenge. Even if there is sufficient warning, as there was in Ukraine this February, deployment could be stalled because of trepidations over fears of escalation or provoking enemy aggression.
What is needed as a first step in establishing regional deterrence in the Pacific and Europe is an assessment of what bare minimum has to be in place before a crisis to assure partners and allies that the coalition can credibly deter. This will include allied contributions, so the demand on U.S. forces will be less than shouldering the entire burden. If what is in place is not sufficient for the plan, it will likely not get there before the onset of hostilities….
Ironically, all the
technologies that have been and are being developed for rapid, decisive offensive operations turn out to be even more formidable in the defense. They deny our adversaries surprise and enable us to dispose our forces where they can most effectively defend against attack. Consequently, as Alex
Vershinin notes: “Emerging technologies in the fields of network, artificial intelligence, and space are shifting the balance back to defenses.” He continues by stating that the United States may have missed this shift and that the consequences are significant: “Unable to fight a short decapitation campaign, the United States may be forced into a prolonged attrition campaign, at unacceptable political costs.”
In the next part of this essay, I will turn to how the war in Ukraine can help the Department of Defense better understand the ascendance of the defense, so it can better prepare for the military problems it faces now and in the future.