I'm in no position to argue with any of the above views, and most are in agreement anyway. But I have a different perspective.
It used to be that 'training' was part of the main procurement programme. In avionic terms, for example, and by edict, the simulator was #3 aircraft in the production/conversion line (after Trials and Proof), for fairly obvious reasons. In materiel and financial provisioning terms, it had the full status of a 2nd line unit. Not a portacabin in the corner of an airfield. To implement these policies, one had to get right all the things mentioned above that have gone wrong. Importantly, each Service had scrutineers who jumped all over you if it was in anyway wrong. Still extant policy, but who knows this, and who in the Services will stand up today and play this red card?
Then along came 'Integrated Logistic Support'. An unfortunate term, given that hitherto ILS meant cradle to grave management, but now referred to one small but crucial part of the whole. Training was shoved into ILS, which of course is the first target for 'savings'. Immediately, there were complete disconnects between aircraft/equipment programmes, and training. The 'ILS Date' would be announced as 'ISD minus 3 months', which is little use if it takes a year to train/convert.
Easy in theory, quite difficult in practice, but nevertheless it worked more often than not because we had guys doing this as a vocation, not a 2 year tour. And you didn't award the main contract, and only then kick off a 3 year tender for the sim or aircrew training. The successful programmes get this kind of stuff right. The last time I did it (long ago now) the key was not PFI'ing the sim. (Which was a matter of saying 'no' in the overseas sales box). The same day, Apache said ok, and look what happened. How many UK standard Apache sims did we sell?
Just a view from a different part of the same process.
A word about CAS. He carries all RAF reputational risk. It's easy for Mr Wallace to say 'fix it'. But like most Duty Holders in MoD, CAS doesn't actually have the wherewithal to do much. He relies on far too many outwith his control. As soon as he engages with, for example, DE&S, he'll perhaps be told by his opposite number that they have conflicting priorities placed upon them by Mr W. Therefore, I'd like to think their joint response was to hand Mr W a shopping list of prerequisites. This is not a matter for CAS alone. It's for the Defence Council and above.