Originally Posted by
langleybaston
Never mind the Stuoid Thoughts, please remind us what the carriers are for?
The carriers are for the related missions of
sea control and
power projection.
Sea control ceased to be seen as a priority during the era when assumptions were made that state versus state competition was a thing of the past and that the maritime and air environments would never been contested. State competition is very much on the rise, with Russia, Iran, and China in a loose alliance that opposes the West and the rules based system. China is trying to build blue water capabilities to rival the Americans, but Russia and Iran are more interested in
sea denial, that is the ability to disrupt or prevent seaborne commerce, the movement of military reinforcements in time of crisis, and the freedom to use the maritime space for things such as amphibious operations.
The carrier, in conjunction with other units, is ideal for
sea control, as it allows a maritime force to launch fighters that can intercept and engage hostile aircraft at much longer range than a shipborne missile system, and before they are in range to fire anti ship missiles. This is down in conjunction with AEW capabilities and anti air warfare warships such as the Type 45 destroyer which provide control as well as another layer of defence. The carrier's fixed wing aircraft may also take the fight to enemy warships, or airfields and missile sites. In the anti submarine warfare role, a carrier can carry multiple ASW helicopters to allow constant operations, and there dipping sonar provides an accurate means of detecting submarines. The ASW helicopters work in conjunction with surface warships, particularly ones with modern towed array sonars such as the Type 23 frigate, which provide long range detection and cuing. They also work with our own submarines and MPA, something that the carrier can coordinate.
Power projection does not just mean attacking or being able to attack targets ashore, it also means things such as amphibious operations which need sea control and contribute to it - for example by controlling islands and parts of coastline.
Anyway - going back to the 1960s, t
he loss of the big carriers was down to a number of reasons, but a major reason was the carrier related staff work used minor wars in the Far East as justification for building new carriers. At the time NATO was our main commitment, including carriers. This was a massive screw up which should be a salutatory lesson.
The increasing Soviet submarine threat meant that the RN needed platforms for multiple ASW Sea Kings. At the same time the Soviets were fitting anti ship missiles to a number of their submarines. These were long range weapons which dependent on targeting information from Soviet Naval Aviation - mostly Bears. The need for a fighter to intercept and deal with the Bear was real, and in many ways part of the ASW mission. There was no slight of hand - these capabilities were needed for our NATO role. The CVS was capable of constant ASW as part of a task group, with constant ASW helicopter sorties and being able of constantly put Sea Harriers up to deal with the Bears trying to send targeting information to an SSGN. However their limited size (due to politics) limited the number of aircraft that could be carried, limited their future flexibility, and limited their ability to fly in poor conditions. All lessons that have been remembered fortunately.
With a new Cold War/era of Violent Peace, the West must once again look to protect its sea lines of communication. Much has been written about carriers and their value to NATO, but this ARRSE thread is especially to the point as it discusses little else:
Late 1970s US Congress Report - The US Sea Control Mission (carriers needed in the Atlantic for Air Defence and ASW - both then and today)
As well as many historical documents such as the declassified 1980s naval strategy documents and US congressional studies, it features many shortly articles as well talks by the likes of Dr John Lehman, US Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1987, and the late Professor Eric Grove, and comments by a Cold War US Navy carrier aviator:
...the primary mission for the CV/CVN in the North Atlantic was not ASW (it was an additional role) but rather AAW to prevent the Backfire/Bears from attacking the convoys. The A-6/A-7s were the organic tankers to push the F-4/F-14 CAP stations out to a range to shoot the archer, not the arrows. Obviously, those roles swapped a bit when you started facing a surface threat or got close enough to land to start contemplating strikes against those Soviet Naval Air Arm airfields.
Here is a talk by the late Professor Eric Grove:
Professor Grove mentions carriers a lot, in terms of protecting shipping and amphibious forces. At 50:15 he suggests that the thing hostile submarine captains dread most of all is the dipping sonar - and that an airborne radar flooding an area will keep the hostile submarines down. He then describes witnessing an ASW exercise in which a number of NATO submarines transmitted Soviet levels of noise, and everyone was covered by either an ASW helicopter or an MPA. Then they turned off the extra noise...
We could also listen to Dr Lehman: