THOUGHTS ON PAWAN HANS S-76D DITCHING AT MUMBAI HIGH

On the morning of June 24, 2022, I tried to encapsulate the monsoon flying challenges faced by helicopter pilots in India in this

Kaypius tweet, Jun 24, 2022Four days later, I put out another

celebrating the early morning sight of a ‘rain-washed, sun-kissed’ tarmac full of offshore helicopters waiting to start their day at Juhu aerodrome. Little did I know the day would end in tragedy for the Indian offshore community just a few hours later.

Kaypius tweet, early morning of June 28, 2022What happened?

A helicopter on crew change duty in India’s ‘Mumbai High’ offshore development area (ODA) ditched at sea Jun 28 about 60 nm from Mumbai claiming four lives. Five others, including two pilots, were recovered from the sea and brought ashore. The helicopter, operated by Pawan Hans Helicopters (PHL) for state-run Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), had taken off from Juhu helibase around 10:54 AM (IST) and was on final approach to ONGC driller ‘Sagar Kiran’ when it ditched at about 11:45 AM.

As per a press release of May 28th from ONGC, the Regional Contingency Plan (West) was immediately activated and navy, coast guard and ONGC assets pressed into service. Four survivors were rescued from sea by offshore support vessel Malviya-16 on standby duty while another was picked-up by the drill ship’s lifeboat. Four others recovered by naval helicopters and shifted ashore, reportedly in an ‘unconscious’ state, did not survive the crash. This includes three ONGC employees and a contract worker. The accident is under investigation by India’s Air Accident Investigation Bureau.

SAR & Contingency Plans

Being spread miles out at sea, any information on a crisis in Mumbai ODA usually reaches the ONGC helibase at Juhu first and then to their regional headquarters through internal channels. All static/moving offshore assets in the ODA, including civil helicopters flying in the field, are monitored through Automatic Identification System (AIS). For example, the fatal crash of VT-PWA (Jan 13, 2018) was first picked up by an alert radio officer after its AIS trace disappeared from his screen.

Indian Navy & ICG ships & helicopters have always responded with alacrity to past crashes in Bombay High. Safety of life at sea in such event depends on “time late at datum”. On Jun 28, the same agencies again responded with military precision. The IN/CG flyboys with their SAR helicopters (Sea King Mk-42C and ALH Mk3 MR) were airborne within 13 minutes of activation, tearing across the Arabian Sea to reach the datum almost 70 miles away. By this time, between Malviya-16 and Sagar Kiran’s lifeboat, five members floating alive and conscious were picked up and transferred to the rig where an ONGC chartered helicopter waited to fly them ashore. As per sources, four passengers, still in the water, showed little signs of life. They were subsequently winched-up using free diver and rescue litter by two naval helicopters. It is quite likely that the “golden hour” had passed by then for these victims.

Representative photo of an AW-139 ex-Abu Dhabi Aviation that ditched at sea 29 Apr 2017 (pic from GCAA investigation report)The Mumbai ODA

The Bombay Offshore Basin is located on the western continental shelf of India between Saurashtra basin in NNW and Kerala, Konkan in the south. It covers an area of about 116,000 square kilometers from coast to the 200 meter isobath. Exploration in the Bombay Offshore Basin started in the early sixties when regional geophysical surveys were conducted by ONGC along with a Russian seismic ship. The first oil discovery in this basin was made by ONGC in February 1974. Subsequent intensification in exploration and development activities in this basin have resulted in several significant discoveries including oil and gas fields like Heera, Panna, Bassein, Neelam, Mukta, Ratna, South Tapti, North of Tapti etc. In addition, number of marginal fields like B-55, B-173A, B-119/121, D-1 and D-18 have been put on production in the last decade (source: DGH, Govt of India).

An important point to reflect upon: Not all the oil fields are close enough where a rescue helicopter from navy or coast guard can reach within the “golden hour”. This raises some important questions:

Who is responsible for providing the first response to air crash/disaster in the ODA?
Should the oil company fall back completely on navy/CG assets or should they have their own contingency capacity?
What assets are available to bridge the gap before a navy/ICG asset reaches on site? Are these adequate and fit for purpose?
During monsoon and adverse weather, what arrangements exist for picking up survivors, especially those with injuries, from the sea before they are overwhelmed by extreme sea states?
Are the seakeeping qualities of rescue vessels and ditching envelope of helicopters taken into account while deciding GO/NO GO in offshore sorties?
Do existing RCPs cater for large scale disasters where even navy/CG capacities can be stretched?
A PHL Dauphin prepares for offshore flight in low visibility (file pic for representation only)

Recall that during Cyclone Tauktae, Mumbai High witnessed widespread death and devastation. Despite heroic efforts of navy & coast guard, 86 crew met a watery grave when AFCONS Barge P-305 floundered in the Heera oil field off Mumbai. I had red-flagged many concerns in a blog I wrote in the aftermath of that tragedy, none of which have valid answers a year later, at least in the public domain.

Corporate communications

Screenshot of ONGC press release on helicopter crash, 28 June 22The press release (snapshot above) from ONGC is an interesting play of words that hides more than it reveals. The title and opening paragraph calls the event an “emergency landing”, highlighting “five survive” — leaving the grim news of four deaths almost like a footnote. It gives out no details of the type of helicopter — an important detail — neither does it clarify if the wreckage or the CVFDR has been located. Names of survivors and victims were left out for reasons unknown. In short, it fails basic tenets of public information in the wake of an accident. Meanwhile, Petroleum Minister Mr. Hardeep Puri named and paid homage to the victims in his

(at 1818 h IST) on Twitter. Similar tardy response and public information gaffes by ONGC also followed the Cyclone Tauktae disaster. On the whole, this leaves a casual observer with mixed signals, and a victim’s family with great anxiety.

Brand new machine, old culture, what changed?

This is the third fatal accident for PHL offshore in last seven years. The previous two accidents claimed all nine lives aboard; same client but the choppers were older AS365 N3 Dauphin helicopters (https://verticalmag.com/news/spatial-disorientation-probable-cause-of-fatal-phl-dauphin-crash/, Jan 13, 2018 & http://164.100.60.133/accident/reports/VT-PWF.pdf Nov 4, 2015). The type of helicopter involved in the latest crash was not mentioned by ONGC even after 24 hours. Pawan Hans

at 2110h, almost ten hours later, that VT-PWI, one of the six Sikorsky S-76D recently leased by PHL — the first one to be released to service for ONGC offshore — was the ill-fated chopper.

PHL crew completed their training on the S-76D at a Sikorsky facility in USA late last year. On completion of on-type training with experienced pilots, PHL crew had started operating these choppers offshore commencing 12th May this year. This is the first time S-76D have been deployed in the Mumbai ODA. This is not the start anybody would have wished on this modern helicopter, its owners or users. The crash also casts a long shadow on ongoing efforts by the Indian government to privatise PHL.

Did enhanced safety regulations have desired outcomes?

The worst helicopter accident in Mumbai offshore took place on Aug 11, 2003 when an Mi-172 operated by Mesco Airlines for ONGC crashed soon after takeoff from the same rig Sagar Kiran,leaving 27 dead. A slew of changes to offshore helicopter operations in India followed after investigation revealed glaring lapses. Current regulations mandate Category A certified helicopters operating under performance class 1 for all offshore operations. Crew and passengers undergo periodic Helicopter Underwater Egress Training (HUET), wear lifejackets and carry air pockets (rebreathers). All offshore helicopters are equipped with Emergency Flotation Gear (EFG), though it is not clear if the EFG operated correctly in the latest crash.

But new machines cannot replace deep-rooted safety culture either side of the PHL-ONGC fence. One hopes that legacy issues in the unholy combination of PHL-ONGC, highlighted by many past investigations, do not raise their ugly head again.

Need for deep investigation & intervention

No probable cause has been attributed to the accident thus far, though ONGC mentions in the press release that rescue operations were conducted under ‘inclement weather’. June is the opening month of southwest monsoon in Mumbai ODA, marked by widespread rainfall and accompanying low visibility. All offshore helicopter operations in India are ‘VFR-only’, though client requirements stipulate pilots should be instrument rated. Past two fatal offshore crashes of PHL Dauphins were attributed to loss of control inflight (LOC-I)following spatial disorientation.

Safety standards in ONGC’s offshore air logistics are among the most stringent, at least on paper. Entry barriers for pilots are high; even experienced military veterans have to cool their heels for 2-3 years (and fly as many monsoons) in the copilot’s seat before they are selected for command. Surviving ditching also depends on various factors, human & material. Recall the Mar 2018 tragedy where an AS350 ditched successfully into East River, New York after engine failure, but all five passengers drowned because they were impossibly locked into their seats with lean-out harnesses.

Whatever be the cause, it is saddening to see the accident-prone run of PHL-ONGC continue unabated. Four out of nine persons did not survive the ditching on Jun 28, 2022. This is a very poor, unacceptable survival rate that rules, regulations and training standards were meant to fix — unless of course, all these have turned “shelfware”. Nothing short of a deep dive & cleansing is called for. Continuing on the path of denial & window-dressing may well end us up in the drink further down the line.

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©KP Sanjeev Kumar, 2022. All rights reserved. Views are personal. I can be reached at [email protected] or on my Twitter @realkaypius. Cover image courtesy PHL Twitter.