In a very safe, yet still evolving industry, the processes required to maintain the highest standards also have to change. The difference between the old and new views of safety (human error) is a simplified example.
Outwardly the FAA and Boeing holds the old view, ‘blame and train’. Build systems assuming that it is possible to sufficiently train people - change human nature - to manage foreseeable situations; thus taking the greatest credit for human performance in system operation - malfunction. (Outwardly Airbus appears to differ - safety attitude - integrated systems; EASA less convincing?)
With evolution, safety depends on recognition that human activity and particularly training is limited, with increasing uncertainty in outcome. Certification decisions via requirement and consensus must now be seen as soft judgements which accommodate the widest range of views and (unforeseen) situations. This in part represents the new view; complex operations depend on human activity, the human is an asset, but limited by the situation.
Certification processes in complex system need greater focus on assumptions and ambiguities, on the situational uncertainties which crews are expected to manage; aviation is slowly adapting, but perhaps not as fast as other industries. 20 yrs ago aviation was the benchmark, HF, CRM, risk management; nowadays aviation appears to lag other transport systems and medical care. In many ways aviation is complacent, slow to change, reluctant to view the world differently.
Note the references below; a wide view, evaluation teams, task orientated.
Human Factors in Risk Assessment
https://www.hse.gov.uk/humanfactors/...assessment.htm
note embedded links and also see links and resources
https://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr679.pdf
https://webarchive.nationalarchives....ctors-guidance
and ‘Reducing Error And Influencing Behaviour hsg48’
“It is our knowledge — the things we are sure of — that makes the world go wrong and keeps us from seeing and learning.” Lincoln Austin Steffens
“We know more than we’re able to explain that we know.
And I call this inarticulate knowledge — the knowledge that I’m not able to articulate to somebody.
And I have inarticulate knowledge about a lot of things, including other people.
I could have tacit knowledge of why I trust somebody that I couldn’t explain to you. If you asked me to give you specific things, I wouldn’t be able to point to that, “Oh, there’s that one time when we were hanging out together,” because it’s probably not any one particular thing. It’s probably a series of things, call it a gut feeling. I just have that.
And I have the same thing for mistrust. Right? And I think that this kind of tacit knowledge and articulate knowledge is undervalued in our society. It’s undervalued because we always want to be able to explain the science and give the hard reasons for it. But a lot of life doesn’t work like that.”
“It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.” Mark Twain