Originally Posted by
Tom Sawyer
The only defence for all this is that around the time of the incident the industry was at reduced manpower and workload levels so there was a lot of "de-skilling" and knowledge fade in the system, and in general, parking and re-activating aircraft in a normal line maintenance environment is not a common procedure. Luckily it was not a primary air data system.
When you say "defence" I suspect you mean "contributing factor". Minor quibble, but the truth of the matter is that the risks associated with this period were easily identifiable and the extra planning, manpower and supervision required to prevent this regrettable incident should have been allocated by management, if they weren't so busy attacking their workforce's pay and conditions. And for that, there is no defence. Luckily, indeed, it was not a primary air data system. If it's like the 350, it's a very important part of the backup air data systems, tho'.