Boeing, significant agreement with your views, however:
- given the extent and speed of change, and increasing complexity in operation, the industry must do more than just note academia, not dismiss it without thought. Academics provide many theories, industry holds the responsibility to translate these into practical activity.
- we should not expect to have a neat, practical solution when considering complex situations.*
Improved understanding is required to help think about issues in different way, to learn, monitor, etc.
- “…
failures are more and more likely to be human-led”. A significant aspect of changing our thinking about safety is to consider joint activity; the human-machine as an entity, or with wider interaction, as a system; view the human as a help within the overall system.
- a system focus should include the variability in operations, also the ambiguities and assumptions, but not to seek a human focussed solution.
What if pilot selection, training, operational performance have reached an ill defined limit due to the complexity of modern operational situations, systematic interactions.
We should not expect to ‘improve’ the human, instead understand, adapt the system to the human. (James Reason)
The EASA implementation of Resilience in CRM appears to have mis-judged these points. Inappropriate focus on the human.
- “… safety systems and regulatory authorities to update their thinking”
They themselves, and then all of us must adopt the concept of Resilience, use holistic (systems) thinking, embrace safety-II, before expecting any meaningful change within the industry.
Resilience is a process looking for viewpoints from which to aid safety.
Is current safety management activity hindering the view by considering resiliences as a solution opposed to activity with a new perspective ?
http://scpsystem.weebly.com/uploads/...s_thinking.pdf
Are current systems of safety management and regulation contributing to the problem - the ‘mess’.
*
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Connect...ts_-_web-2.pdf
We should be gardeners, not architects; tend to what we have, avoid partially effective, costly destabilising interventions.