Mike, ‘
a disconnect in regulation’, I agree, but what to do about it.
Your ‘definitions’, constrain resilience; a problem with this is the loss the systems viewpoint, and a tendency to revert to old views of safety management.
The view of the individual (pilot), could be visualised as a system with analogy using the SHELL model. The simple human centred radial connections (HF CRM), would be joined up to form a system of all of elements interacting with each other, - a ‘system’ spiders web. In addition, a systems view is required for all of the factors within each element. Perhaps the concept maps (page 27 -) in the ‘Reliance on Resilience’ ref attempts to consider this - but these are not systems maps
A crew view (CRM) would consist of two or more interconnected and interacting SHELL diagrams with increasing complexity.
Using the same analogy, an operator or regulator ‘system’ would have to encompass every aspect of every diagram, every element, etc, etc. Hence Hollnagel’s intractable system, uncertainty in everything.
From this the need is to manage uncertainty in operations. This would involve the attributes which you identify, but they could be better considered as capacities, potential for managing uncertainty, before, during, and after the fact.
The behaviour associated with these (tacit) capacities is difficult to impart in training; and should not be, (cannot be), measured. This questions the use of ‘Evidence’ based training, opposed to a need for ‘Experience’, improved knowledge and judgement in uncertainty, adding to the way we think. These critically start with awareness - situational understanding.
Outward behaviour might be observed, but this requires simulation of an uncertain situation. Although potentials cannot be seen directly they might be discussed via questioning and debriefing.
Even if instructors believe that they have created realistic (uncertain) situation, their views cannot be related to the trainees’ because there is no correct answer in uncertain situations, no predefined outcome, no SOP. It is these aspects which the industry has to appreciate in their revised thinking about safety.
It is interesting to see the differing approaches to the word ‘resilience’. Academic vs practical, the latter invariably involving compromise, which inappropriately remains under the ‘resilience’ title because that is what the regulator specified.
Thus after the search for a definition, it might better not to have one, neither to use the word resilience at all. The need for change is in safety viewpoint, thinking, how to manage uncertainty, enhance the skills of awareness, judgement, in unforeseeable situations.
“…
with popularity has come noise and confusion as the label (resilience) continues to be used in multiple, diverse and, sometimes, incompatible ways.’
https://www.researchgate.net/profile...ication_detail