Further observations from the safety statistics.
A comparison between different generations of aircraft strongly suggests that technology has improved safety. However, as the new generation aircraft are still crewed in the conventional sense, then the technology and associated training will have reduced the human contribution in incidents. There are fewer accidents overall, the human contribution has reduced, i.e. pilots of gen 3-4 aircraft appear more capable - better matched competency - the combination of man and machine.
Exceptions would be in older generations where there are many gen 3 aircraft which were designed as gen 2, but with system updates pretend to be gen 3; e.g. B 737, F100, ARJ, and B 757.
The perceived training and proficiency issues in current operations with older generation aircraft could be due to crews being exposed to other factors, e.g. older aircraft in a new aircraft operational environments.
Also that safety management has moved away from accidents (very few of them), to focus on events, which previously could have been accepted as normal, and not necessarily ‘unsafe’ depending on outcome.
Modern aircraft with event auto reporting or FDR analysis might proportionately identify more safety events, but are not less safe because of knowledge and investigation.
Operations without reporting could experience the same event, remaining unknown, similarly not less safe.
The industry assumes too much about the human contribution, the ability to manage changes in design, training, and operation, particularly in older aircraft; there is a mismatch in man-machine (and operational situation) competency where substandard operation is inappropriately focussed on the human.
Safety is not so much about where a line is drawn it depends on who draws it, interpretations, judgement after fact.