Your observation is quite valid. The reliance on automation moves the center of error usually from the pilot towards the system architecture and embedded logic, which is great when it works, and not so great when it doesn't. You don't need Kev Sullivan's cosmic radiation bit flip to mess you up, something as simple as AA 965 disclosed the hidden issue with ARINC standards. Sure, a crew should have picked up the problem
Running off the end of the runway as the FD bar is zero attitudes is still incomprehensible as an SA state for any pilot that went solo in a bug smasher, or could drive a car, or ride a bike. The airline concerned needs to go and do a collective belly button contemplation as to how they ended up with that being a solution selected by a trained pilot, as it suggests a gross failure of the total system, not just the pilot, unless, the pilot happened to have a brain tumor or other cognitive impairment. Now, the B777 did have a miserable day many years ago with a high-speed RTO in Nigeria, where the AP had accidentally been engaged, and the driver felt severe restriction when pulling back on the controls. That was an ugly day out and set the manufacturer to print an AOM on the matter, but... golly, following a FD on the ground, is a weird state of affairs, and more bizarre when the guidance is illogical. What has our industry become?
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You make important points. The airline responsible has a 'big issue' with training and culture, all held together with fear. The CRM and safety industry in the west has been aware of this for some time. This airline spends many days a year studying crew resource management.
The cabin crew are controlled in the severest of fashion.
To be candid...." all the gear but no idea" . Such a shame that this is the case.
Rgds R20deg