Russia is
approaching the limits of the combat-capable manpower it can make available for the war in the short term. It has committed a significant portion of its combat-capable units to Ukraine and has suffered major losses. Troops have been pulled from every possible direction: private military contractors redeployed, recruits ginned up from Syria, and locals in occupied areas forcefully conscripted. Few options remain.
It would take Putin months to put new, usable combat troops into Ukraine. Once rejuvenated, however, Russian military progress in Ukraine could look very different if it attacks from its current lines, compared with its starting positions from February. Meanwhile, in the months or years leading up to that renewed offensive, Russia’s presence in the southeast would impose a perpetual burden on Ukraine to defend this vast front line.
While Russian forces have begun to entrench defensively in the east and south, they are concurrently still trying to advance. The West must help the Ukrainians get a broader counteroffensive underway before Russia transitions to a coherent and planned defense, which it has not yet done.
The longer Russia is allowed to stay, the costlier it becomes to drive it out. Time also gives Putin an opportunity to adapt the Russian people to the idea of a long war and put the Russian economy on a wartime footing.
The West’s attention is focused on Russia’s war in Ukraine, but this Western attention is not a constant nor a given. Putin has achieved some of his advances over the past 20 years simply by outlasting the West in the information space. The West should provide Ukraine with weapons at the pace and scale that matches the requirement of a Ukrainian campaign to expel Russian forces and liberate its people and land.