Originally Posted by
tartare
Interesting to read intelligence assessments out of Washington over the last 24 hours that Putin is settling in for a long war.
If that's the case then he plays right into Western hands.
The combined power of NATO can continue to outspend and out arm him.
Given the ratio of Russian losses to Ukrainian - and if their current incompetence continues - he's going to prolong grinding his army and the VVS up against a cheese grater...
On the ground: Invaded ground that is.
A "long" war seems to defy practical considerations. On average, RuAF is losing a BGT level of capability as hard losses every 2 days. Including injuries that preclude an immediate return to the front after first aid, that is more than 1 BTG a day that is unable to be part of "The Putin Grand European Tour, '22". The RuAF started out with a total force across Russia of... 174 BTG, at the end of 2021.
On logistics: from the people who brought empty shelves and queues for queues' sake
Russia is facing an increased probability of having their supply lines interdicted in the near future, and they have been woeful even when only interdicted by incompetence. The "land bridge" is at greater risk today then it was a month ago, and that risk increases for the Russians by every day that Ukraine increases their long-range artillery capability, with the forward observing by drones. perhaps Russia can add an order for some better artillery with the USA or Canada or Germany, or Sweden, or UK, or Botswana... The Russians shot off a majority of the PGM's predominantly against civilian targets, which looks like it will come back and bite them not only in the Hague but on their supply lines. The majority of the imagery of this voyeur war has been of tank turret tosses and MRLS cooking off, but the Russians have had their supply lines disrupted in the targeting of fuel tankers, supply trucks and similar critical supply chain transport units. The rail system that is the backbone of the Russian military system is not particularly effective in Ukraine but makes for great targeting options for the Ukrainians. Russia doesn't have the HoChiMinh trail option available, and they don't have the manpower to make such a trail work anyway. (refer moral imperiative)
In the Air: (caution: aviation content)
Despite having the initiative from day one, Russia had failed to achieve anything near control of the air over the battlefield. SEAD has had some effect, but the losses that the Ukrainians suffered to SEAD were made up in the larger systems from items abandoned by the Russians. MANPADs have been effective in suppressing Russia's G/A capability. The Ukrainians have been hit by long-range SAMs at the start of the event, and by AAA and tactical SAM systems since then, so the air battle remains contested. Flying any type of chopper around Eastern Ukraine seems to be bad for occupants' health. Long-range guided missiles used by the Russians were targeted against legitimate military targets for the first 48-hours and then used as terror weapons against the population. The effect has been to increase the public resolve against Russia and to add more charges to the sheet for the future hearings in the Hague.
On the Sea: See under the sea.
Russia had overwhelming strategic and tactical advantages over Ukraine, which the Ukrainians were well aware of. The Russians seem to have squandered their advantages to the greatest extent, and now are facing serious constraints against deploying any naval forces, other than their submarines. The video of an attack on a submarine seems to defy reason, but then, so does much of what has been observed of Russian "might" in the last 2 months. Submarines alone don't win wars, just like aircraft do not. They can cause loss of sea lanes, but Ukraine is able to be supplied by land borders that cannot be interdicted effectively by Russia, and so the effect is limited in scope. Landing covert action forces in the SW of Ukraine would be a high-risk option, yet there seems to be a continued interest in the Russian fleet to support the deployment of forces by sea. Russia still has some more ships to throw away, so that seems like a probable popcorn event to come. The Kilo's are small boats, they don't have the ability to land large attack forces, so they seem to be destined to add to mayhem on the civil population as that is what Russia does. Ukraine needs some nice little mines to add to the area around the approaches to Sevastopol, and some radio relay to extend TB-2 attacks to the moored Kilos, that would seem to be a good use of some air time.
Under the Sea: See on the sea, except for the sunk vessels, and the Kilos.
Economics: Taking the lead from Zimbabwe
Russia managed to self impose sanctions on around 90% of their foreign sales by denying any oil and gas sales except in rubles. They were in the top 21 GDP nations before taking the. Grand Tour, and now are around running around the same as Portugal. PPP GDP was almost the same as the Maldives, until the start of the tour, now it is about the same as Djibouti, and heading towards Zimbabwe. refer Arms Exporting.
As an Arms Exporter: Get your discounted arms here! going out of business sale.
Russia was a major arms supplier to the world to the 3rd world, but the performance of their military in the Grand tour has hardly promoted their products. those countries with any ill intentions to their neighbors will be checking up on the warranty cards of Russian arms I would expect. That could give a great opportunity for employment within Russia for the customer complaints lines and return of defective items to Rosoboroneksport.
As a Federation: Togetherness.
The Russian Federation came about from the Minsk agreement for the 3 major parts of the Federation at that time, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, in early December 1991, and then just before Xmas 1991, the follow on the signing of 22 of the 23 former USSR states to the Alma Ata Protocols. The Alma Ata protocols permit free succession from the federation by any state. The Baltic states took to their Reeboks and left the stage early on, and that was more or less honored. Ukraine followed suit. The other states had their independent actions curtailed by Boris to start with, and then by Putin, as he won hearts and minds in Grozny, and other exotic locations, Ingushetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and other idyllic getaways. Many states, including the greater landmasses of the Russian Federation, have no love for Moscow. They have been held in check by the constant threat of force as applied by Moscow, amply demonstrated to uppity states by Moscow's kind treatment of Grozny and other populations. That situation may no longer hold sway, where the military has been effectively decommissioned by the Adventures of Putin. The majority of the remaining forces in Russia at present that have not been mauled by Ukraine, if moved to Ukraine leave the states without any enforcement from the Krimlin, so may put the federation at risk.
Wistful reminiscence of the Soviet Union: The good old days.
The USSR is looked at fondly by people who are stuck in the failed states of Russia and in the nosuchstate of transpositionitrisiania (Transnistria, AKA Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic). Memory seems to be fickle, or damaged by brutality, as the proponents of the glory of Communist Russia seem to conveniently neglect to recall the deprivations that occurred by the vicious state apparatus that existed at that time, and which made life a living hell for all concerned. Calls for the reincarnation of Lav Beria and similar charmers of the USSR seem to indicate some selective memory on the actions of the NKVD and other pleasures of the USSR's nod to Dale Carnegie. The collapse of the Russian economy (don't count a controlled ruble as an indicator of health... if you don't trade something you can say it is worth whatever you want to say, but the moment it hits the market, the market will show the FMV) will increase the wistful reminiscence for the USSR which was such a pleasure to have wished for. Whether the USSR really was utopian is pretty much indicated by the direction that guns had to be pointed at the border... they were mainly aiming at their own population, not outwards.
Oil 'n Gas: Russia's contribution to greening the world.
Russia has managed to lose all prior partners in the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbon-based energy. Not sure what passes for future contract boilerplate clauses, but can't imagine too many boards of directors giving go-ahead for investment in such an unreliable partner. Russia should have the ability to extract and manage their own resources, but the evidence suggests that is not currently possible. This incompetence seems to arise from the kleptocracy that is such an ingrained feature of Russia today. Oil 'n gas was ~ 60% of export earnings of the federation.... The problem with impacting production is that as often as not, the restart of a field is compromised, and takes a long time if it is possible at all. That always seems like an odd problem, but...
resilience.org.
Standing Army: The might of the fomer USSR.
Russia had the 5th largest standing army on paper, for a really long time. Right now, it is hard to see that they have a larger force than Israel, which was 29th in the world...
Kleptocracy: Robbing hood
Russia's post-USSR development was based in part on recommendations from the West as to how to restart an economy after a collapse. The guidance was to transfer to private sectors from state-owned enterprises, which seemed like a reasonable means to stimulate a market-driven economy instead of a supply-side central-controlled economy. Except that the state gave the state assets over to the top thugs, not to the public. That puts Russia in the position that it now has as far as plunder of national wealth goes. As the bosses are krims residing in the krimlin, the military started to sell off arms and bits and pieces. The story of the army bosses selling tank barrels for scrap may be apocryphal but has a ring of truth. The understaffing of the BTGs suggests that phantom troops have been part of the OOB for some time.
Russia and NATO border countries: How to force countries to join NATO
Russia has had common borders with NATO states for some time; yet gets so uppity over Ukraine that they force 2 more unaligned countries to join as Russia made threats reminiscent of those made against Ukraine. Russia uses the pretext of "protecting" Russian speakers from aggression from other populations, so that means parts of NY will probably come under the threat of Russian attack, as does the west end of London, ("Bortch 'n Tears is still there...) There are Russian emigrés in most countries of the world, and some do still think that the grass was greener under Stalin than where they are now. What Ukraine has taught the world at large and Finland & Sweden, in particular, is that Russia is not to be trusted.
Russia's border security: Why would some country want to attack Russia?
Russia doesn't have a risk of a NATO country attacking it. The last 2 dictators that tried to do that, in 1812 and 1941 didn't do well doing so, and in both cases there was no rational concept as to what a win would actually look like. How was Napoleon going to subjugate the population of the whole of the continent with an army that he could not afford in the first place? Paranoia doesn't mean that someone isn't trying to get you, but Ukraine did not attack Russia, and the last 8 years have never included the invasion of Russia by Ukraine, the invaders are clear by their presence in a foreign land. The apathy and disinterest of military-aged Russians would change in a heartbeat with an invasion of Russia proper by a foreign force, (a real one, not a GRU/FSB false flag...).
Morale & Morals: Not happy campers
Russian combat troops were lied to from the start, and there is not much more corrosive than that. The troops live the result of the lies of the Krimlin, and the klepto-kronies, hardly surprising that the troops started pushing back. Doesn't seem to be a surprise that the troops spiked their own vehicles, or rounded up on the backstop NKVD like Chechnya troops. It is not possible to hide the losses of troops much longer, the performance of the army in the field, and the number of troops that can not communicate to their families is unmanageable. Propaganda only goes so far.
Watch for Ukraine cutting off RuAF MSRs and starting to get mass surrenders in the field. RuAF have limited capability to attack Odessa by land, and the sea remains attractive except that it has a very low probability to succeed. The window for Russia to do anything is closing fast, and the issues are all immediate, not the mid to long-term matters that can be fixed by mobilization or entering a wartime economy. The Kerch bridge still needs to go, ASAP, and Sevastopol sea lanes need to be interdicted.
To rebuild the losses, Russia needs more time and resources than exist at this time, so perhaps the best win for Putin is a negotiation ASAP, before the situation ends up with the isolation of Russian forces in Crimea, and the disruption of all Russian forces in east Ukraine. Putin is not of a mind to do anything good for Russia, so it remains of morbid interest to see what other damage he does to Russia.