Originally Posted by
The Sultan
From the report:
Bottom line there should not have been a single unenunciated failure mode that could lead to ground resonance. The question now is why did NAVAIR allow this design to proceed?
FMEA or design assessment reports or related documents could hold the answer to that question.
The braided hose has redundancy, but the fittings do not.
The Navy Command Report has some interesting items that reflect on the assessment of the design…
· Hose is an “on condition” part.
· Hose is inspected at various intervals.
· Hose replacement rate is about 1 per aircraft per year.
· The mishap aircraft had 2 hose changes in the month prior to the event.
· “Mechanical damage (flattening) of steel braid strands on a damper hose would not be evident during any external inspections.” The braid is covered by a chafing guard, and it therefore not visible.
· A one time replacement of all fleet hoses was recommended.
· Fleet inspections apparently have not been changed.