Originally Posted by
Discorde
The necessary MCAS training input could have been very simple (and cheap): promulgation of an operational notice along the lines of:
The Max version of the B737 incorporates a modification to the stabilizer trim system to counteract the adverse effects of the engine nacelle geometry on the aircraft’s stalling characteristics. If pilots observe any activity in the stabilizer trim system when it should be inactive they should immediately accomplish the STAB TRIM RUNAWAY checklist.
Which is exactly what the Ethiopian crew did. MCAS was given far too much authority with a single point of failure.
I don’t think the MCAS system on its own was enough to require a new type rating or additional sim training. I’m not certain though and will happily be corrected. The main issue was Boeing were trying to hide that this airplane does not handle like it’s predecessors. MCAS was the band aid. If they’d been open about their solution to the handling characteristics, the FAA may* have reigned in the authority of MCAS and insisted on tying it to both AoA vanes. Only then would your suggested operational notice be sufficient.
*That is a very big may as the FAA may well have taken Boeing at their word that MCAS was safe as it was originally designed.