Originally Posted by
SASless
Nutty made this post in an on-going thread and while looking for the linked video it gave me reason to think back on the subject of the video....that being an ass kicking the US Army took near Kabala one night when a fleet of AH-64 Apaches encountered a very strong and innovative defense by the Iraqi's.
The "rest of the story" about that night is very interesting....how the Iraqi's improvised their tactics to counter the US Army use of darkness....using Cellphones and a unified control of surface lighting to expose the hovering Apaches......an American Tactic coming from its employment strategy countering Russian Armor moving through the Fulda Gap in Germany.
Add to that the insistence upon strict adherence to the published ROE's which granted little or no discretion to the Army Crews.
If we take an honest look back over time....we can see other similar failures to abandon poor tactical concepts that in peace time are foreseen (falsely) to be the way of the future.
Those failures lead to loss of life and equipment.
I saw first hand how that could work while flying helicopters in Vietnam....back during the early days of "Air Mobile Operations" which morphed into "Air Assault" with mottos like "Death From Above" and "Land On Top Of The Enemy".
Landing formations of helicopter right smack dab on top of well armed, well prepared, aggressive and dedicated enemy troop formations.....now whatever could possibly go wrong with that kind of thing?
Another example was this Apache Raid that went so wrong.....early on here at this Forum I admonished our Apache Drivers to rethink the Hover and Shoot Tactic....as it might have its place in the Tool Box....but it would not be how a War in the Desert would be fought and be successful and that in time they would find themselves returning to the old fashioned "Shoot and Scoot" method of doing Gun Runs while being provided covering fire from Wingmates more often than they would employ the Hover and Shoot method.
The RAF learned low level high speed runs dropping bombs on Runways came at a very high cost and it would alter its tactics to going back to mid-level heights and cut their losses as a result.
Not so long ago we had a thread about American efforts to drop some bridges in North Vietnam, all of which failed, until Precision Bombs were invented then the bridge got dropped and aircraft losses were prevented.
Today in Ukraine we see the Russians struggling to cope with a very dedicated and innovative Ukraine Military.
The lack of foresight and demonstrated inability of Military Forces to see the fallibility in its planning for future wars is not limited to any one Nation or single branch of the Armed Forces.
It does make you wonder why we see it time after time.....and pay such a price in Lives and Equipment.
Reflecting on the original dit with the AH crew struggling with the target ID and returning of fire, I think one possible reason for the confusion/delay was the surprise element of being on a two way range for the first time/first time in a while (ie experience/skill fade).
Having been sat in the back of a Chinook on a night HAF, watching the tracer going past the windows opposite and then looking out of the window over my shoulder and seeing the red dots zipping towards us a few of us were wondering why the door guns weren't singing in response. I was on the air freq and the AH escort was calling out the targets and sending 30mm the other way but there was a delay of what seemed like forever (probably only 15-30 seconds in reality) before the Ch crews began shooting back. Knock it off was given at a couple of hundred ft AGL and we RTB'd for the AAR. The Ch crews were new in Th and I think that may have been the main factor for the delayed response.
I had been in Th for months at that point and it wasn't my first tour so was entirely comfortable with the RoE, having been engaged on a weekly basis every week since arriving. Whilst it was frustrating the element of surprise had been lost and we would have to replan for another Op into the area at a later date, I was sympathetic to the crew, remembering my first contact where my oppo and I were literally standing there wondering if it was actually us being shot at, despite the cracks and splashes in the immediate surroundings.
It's quite easy to become complacent in training because it's rare for the Blue forces to "lose". TESEX in BATUS for example is usually the first time commanders have to consider combat effectiveness as they find their troops taking "casualties" in real time.
I think the next lesson to be (re)learnt will be what happens if we get into a shooting war where we don't have a dedicated MERT and Role 3 within 30 minutes of the FEBA.