It is simply brilliant to see Dick post an opinion continuing an energetic conversation of half a decade ago and the debate just launches beautifully into an elegant multi-stream hydra of profundity and bogusness. But I compliment everybody on the content. Advance & Geoff Fairless make lovely sense. Plazbot does not disappoint with his insightful comment. It would be lovely if this stuff DID influence the vote here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_G...yst_for_change
As Missy indicates, I have taken my 39.5 years of ATS experience and become a LEGEND, (Learned Erstwhile Gentleman Experiencing New Directions). I have looked into all this stuff from the prospect of an Australian ATC and a VFR private pilot, with a very limited experience of flying in the US. I am not seeking or expecting re-employment from the lovely department of many names. My other identities can wither and die, and SPODMAN will communicate anything I have to say from henceforth. From the above debate:
Why do even those who were involved in past change debacles seem so uninformed: Being involved in the implementation of NAS and the previous LLAMP way back when I could see a HUGE disconnect. Those driving the project had their eye on the finish line, and assumed everybody else did too. Any pushback on any element was seen as an attack on the project end-state. Line controllers, dedicated competent controllers, proud of their safety record and their own drive for an efficient service, had no appreciation or great understanding of the end state, and saw each individual element as a bizarre distraction from their core business, with no plausible benefit, and pushed back on details. I can't speak for the attitudes of professional pilots, but discussions with individual pilots in safety discussions and pilot union groups at the time seemed quite similar. The debate above seems to make more sense when looked at this way.
Why didn't NAS go forward: Management seemed to welcome being bypassed by the 'crash through or crash' implementation process until somebody noticed that despite Dick and side-kicks bashing individual bits of the US system to fit, in a process that may have worked when they all came together, it was not following the process for implementing new procedures THEY were responsible for. So they rolled the stuff back that had not been introduced with a valid safety analysis or valid comparison with the US system, then said, "Now do it properly." Nobody did, and we are stuck with a half-assed system. The service provided at Mangalore aerodrome today is fundamentally the same as when I did it from Melbourne FIS7 in 1991, and from the year after that there has been radar coverage in the circuit permitting a premium US-style Enroute ATC approach service at high efficiency, but we don't do it. Last year there was a proposal to lower Class E to 1500'AGL in the J-curve. BRILLIANT! Ham-fisted implementation needlessly locking VFR out the airspace may have led to a less practical change.
The US hasn't got G airspace: They have lots. They have a network of skinny airways, with G airspace underneath below 1,200' AGL, lowering to 700' AGL in terminal areas. Between the airways are blocks of G from the surface to 18,000'
The US wouldn't separate in G airspace: They do! It doesn't matter what is written down, a US pilot would not take off into IMC without a clearance, even if they have to do it by telephone and cop a delay. If the conditions are visual they can get airborne and enter Class E, but if they get airborne and require an immediate clearance it is their problem if ATC say, "Unable clearance." The NAS 'IFR Pickup' procedure was supposed to replicate this, rather torturously and impractically, because it permitted IFR flight without a clearance in Class G in the interim stages.
What would have happened at Mangalore if NAS had been fully implemented: Full and due respect for all those working or flying that day. If this had happened to me on FIS7 in 1991, or with the arrangements today and all boxes real or imaginary everybody could think of ticked, the outcome could have been exactly the same. With Class E base 1200', a cloud base of 4,000', airplane #1 on instrument approach, and airplane #2 taxies. They are told, "Unable clearance, call again at time [xx]". Everybody is safe. When #1 gets visual he has the option of cancelling IFR enabling a clearance. #2 has the option of departing VFR, and getting a clearance when ATC has 5 miles by radar or #2 lands or gets 1,000' above the MSA on a missed approach. This is what Dick wants. It is good. It is needed. It is best for everybody. It is just obviously fahking simple! If it makes it impractical to do practice VOR approaches at Manglore, stiff sh1t!
Please keep banging, Dick!