Local sunset in Odeassa is 19:45 direction 286° West. So if the two (?) missiles did not either/both put in significant doglegs (though some doglegs would be the norm) then they were likely coming from roughly up-sun if it was a late-afternoon / early evening engagement. That is one reason I am trying to understand the time of engagement. Another is to understand the damage control timing better.
If the main phased array radar was either trying to track one (or more ?) TB2 on a different bearing, then it is possible that the first observation might have been visual. That is not so unusual with these sorts of naval engagements.
The RORSAT pictures show the Russian vessels in a NE-SW line, almost as if they were seeking to act as a radar blockade as well as a surface blockade, the point being that it is possible there was no other vessel that was more up-threat than the Moskva itself.
The speculation regarding the SSN-12 deck-mounted missles going up has, as far as I can see, no evidence basis. I'm not saying it is unlikely, but we have no reason to believe it vs any other explanation. I too suspect she rolled over fairly quickly - that would be consistent with what has been observed about Russian naval architecture and the likely damage and the reported level of casualties. Again, understanding the timeline is informative if more information is forthcoming.
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Looking to the future it is fairly obvious that the loss of that Moskva radar and the associated S300 battery on Moskva leaves a pretty big hole in the Russian anti-air defences in that sector. The remaining vessels do not have anywhere near the same anti-air capabilities as the Moskva did.
The SA-4 "Gecko" SAMs on the two Krivak frigates and the corvettes only have a ~10-mile range. Therefore these have no real impact on the aviation war over the land, and a really only for self-defense purposes.
The naval variant of the SA-11/17/27 "Buk" SAMs on the three Grigorovich are the later VLS type with a range of 50km/30nm, so comparable to Sea Dart and looking at the specs not to be sneered at. Useful as a naval task force area air defence system, but not really capable of directly intervening in the aviation war over the land unless they are able to park the ships right up close to the coast (which to be fair, they can do in Azov Sea and by Crimea).
Overall the loss of the Moskva has pretty much taken the Russian Navy out of the game of direct intervention in aviation over the land area of Ukraine which will reduce complications and provide opportunities for Ukraine pilots / UAVs.
However the remaining naval platforms may still have some utility as ESM platforms, and the Grigorovichs have a pretty potent radar system. I'm not sure if the Russians can network that into a common air picture with their land sensors.
The Ukraine now has a lot more freedom to manouevre both in the air and at sea in the south, onshore and offshore. Whether they have anything left that floats is a different matter. They are however due to receive at least one USV soonish.
[edit : I see Wiki has been updated since my post this morning, and is now saying the missile egagement was in "Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych and Odesa governorMaksym Marchenko said their forces hit Moskva in the early hours of 13 April 2022,". That implies far earlier in the day than previously thought. It is possible that the night-time image referred to in the Forbes aticle I referenced was taken in early morning 13-Apr rather than late evening 13-Apr]