This issue should have been identified during design, (system specification and vendor build) and/or manufacturer checking and testing.
Perhaps Boeing did not know of this, neither the FAA - deficient process
Alternatively, the issue was identified, but accepted as a crew management task dependant on system description and procedures, although none have been identified “… this specific scenario is not explicitly described …” (FAA SAIB)
Reliance on crew knowledge and procedure is difficult to judge, perhaps biased by the Boeing philosophy defaulting to crew choice, always in the loop, desription, procedure, vice system inhibits; recent 737 history identified flawed thinking.
Also the FAA, with knowledge, could have judged the issue as not meeting the requirements, but similarly with recent history, judgement can be bypassed by self certification or poor system knowledge by those responsible for oversight.
25.1302 assumes operation by a trained crew, but if the system description is poor or non existent, then the requirement is not met: … does the simulator behave in the same way as the aircraft ?
Similar issues with the 777 AT going to ‘sleep’; modifications followed ?
This issue warrants modification, but when, by whom ?