Aviation safety is required to confront and manage risk. The overall view is that the current processes provide a level which is acceptable to both the industry and travelling public. Trust is an important, although ill defined component in these interactions, and depends on knowledge and understanding of risk - actual risk, perceived risk, communication of risk (beware tabloid risk).
The Max challenged the actual risk for the 737, Boeing, and FAA; a loss of trust.
The aftermath involved rebuilding trust in a suspicious world muddied by other events and ill-informed media reporting.
From a certification and airworthiness viewpoint the 737 meets the same requirements as other aircraft - status quo. Flight crew trust is being resorted in the aircraft, but perhaps more slowly that in the manufacturer and regulator; best to believe actions rather than words.
The report below gives an interesting view of a small sample of how people in the industry perceive risk:-
‘Distress call from the flight deck: Cross-Cultural survey of aviation professionals reveals perception that flight safety is decreasing’.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268271017
“… analysis of interviews with twenty-three aviation professionals from four European countries. According to these front-line operators, while aviation statistics may still portray a healthy industry, the operational reality is another matter altogether: the negative impact of economic scarcity and the ever-increasing focus on profits has reduced safety through changes in management practices, organisational structure, and regulations.”
“In response to the question “Do you think aviation is safe?” several people responded “yes…”, paused, seemingly conflicted, and then qualified their response with explanations like: “it is statistically safe” or “safer than all the other modes of transportation”. They generally described behavioural, procedural, and operational examples of “safety” in their daily work. This revealed a distinction between safety as the active experience of an activity (e.g. flying) in contrast to the “safety level” described by statistics reflecting the outcomes of that activity (e.g. fatalities or hull losses). A review of the interview data reveals that, with very few exceptions, safety was discussed as the qualitative, tangible experience of the risk involved in the activity, and this risk is compared to some cognitive or affective baseline – what could be considered the “comfort level” of the individual.”
The operational industry should be careful with understanding risk - a fear of fear alone; this is difficult in the current world situation. Beware misplaced initiatives after covid, lest they rock the boat.
The operational profession must retain confidence in itself; the means and assessment of this may differ from the theoretical regulatory view, but what ever is being done - keep calm and carry on safely.