Interesting article explaining Russian motives - and possible target of an6 attack….
“….Seizing and occupying territory could be a means of raising pressure on Kyiv, but occupying terrain would not be the ultimate objective. If Russia had sought to occupy more territory, the past few weeks of public ultimatums would have been counterproductive, simply giving Ukraine and NATO more time to prepare. Some
analyses have mentioned potential options to seize a land bridge between the Donbas and Crimea, an operation in Odessa, or even an attempt at
occupying Western Ukraine. If the purpose is to compel Ukraine’s leadership, then a ground invasion only makes sense if it puts Ukraine in a more untenable or threatened position. Neither a land bridge nor an operation in Odessa would likely achieve that result, but an offensive towards Kyiv could.
The current posture of Russian forces points to a ground invasion towards the Ukrainian capital as a more likely option. Compared to the spring, when many of the reinforcements were sent to Crimea, Russia has now deployed a significant share of its forces, primarily the 41st Combined Arms Army, to
Yelnya, to the north of Ukraine. These are in addition to the
1st Tank Army units deployed to Pogonovo, 100 miles to the northeast of Ukraine’s border. Kyiv is approximately 110 miles from the northern border with Russia, and Moscow is deploying its reinforcements in the regions where they could launch offensives from Ukraine’s northern and northeastern borders. Russia has also begun moving equipment to smaller encampments near the border in the
Bryansk, Belgorod, and Kursk regions. The transfer of Russian units to Belarus for the upcoming exercise increases the threat posed along Ukraine’s northern border.
The most likely ground offensive option is that the Russian military would focus on destroying Ukrainian military units east of the Dnieper River, inflicting casualties, taking prisoners of war, destroying military equipment, and degrading defense capabilities. This could include a planned withdrawal — a punitive raid —possibly after one or two weeks. It could also involve occupying terrain outside Kyiv and threatening the capital unless Russia’s demands are met. Such an operation would more closely resemble a more aggressive version of Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008 than its annexation of Crimea. By inflicting heavy losses on the Ukrainian military, taking prisoners of war, and degrading Kyiv’s defense capabilities, Russia could potentially alter Zelensky’s incentive structure sufficiently to induce painful concessions. An additional benefit of such an operation is that it would likely be less costly and would not require Russian forces to enter cities, which would increase the risk of civilian casualties and make an insurgency more effective…..”