A couple of points have me scratching my head, but it all starts with awareness of
"I am in an OCF condition"
This assessment sometimes takes more time to realize than others.
After a bit of looking, the decision time (per the NATOPS and the CNATRA OCF syllabus for the T-6A/B) for ejection is basically "if in OCF, or still in OCF, at or below 6000', Eject"
(Excerpted from the pdf SpazSinbad kindly linked to)
1. Westendorf noted that Ross and Garrett — it is not clear which of them were at the controls at the time — stalled the aircraft {snip} as they approached the airfeld near Foley, a circumstance "which is abnormal for that phase of fight." Westendorf's review also notes that the two flyers "failed to initiate out-of-control flight procedures" after the stall and crashed 22 seconds later from an altitude of 3,800 feet. Also, Westendorf notes that "despite the crew's time and altitude after stall entry, neither member-initiated ejection." "... (T)aking appropriate action in these situations may have saved their lives," he concluded.
Similarly, Marine Corps Col. Jefrey Pavelko, commander of Training Air Wing Five at NAS Whiting Field, noted in his review the "... disastrous, perplexing end to this fight ..." as he also noted that a high-banked left turn preceding the stall, the lack of out-of-control fight procedures, and the failure to eject from the aircraft... remain unexplained ... ."
It is noteworthy, to me, that not too long before they entered this area near Barin field, they'd been (per other information) doing high work which may have included stall and / or spin training.
This is a common profile in primary training: you go and do your high work first, and then you head to an outlying field to do some landing pattern work.
It is not unusual for the transition from high work to pattern work be along the lines of "You have X malfunction {simulated} " and the student then assesses "How do I set up an emergency landing profile?" and so on which often ends up being an entry to the outlying field at High Key. (Not sure how many hundreds of times I did that in the years that I instructed...) The Wing commander notes a high AOB turn being abnormal for that phase of flight and uses the term "perplexing" - which it is.
I choose not to speculate further ~ yes, I have a few ideas on what may have happened but there is more than one way this could have come to pass. If the formal report (I suspect that the JAG investigation is what is being referred to here, not the mishap report) cannot present a clearer cause and effect I'll not muddy the waters.
@gums: I suspect that if you poke around the Naval Safety Center's web site you may get the "public release" version of that report, but those tend to be sparse on details.