Stab, thank you for the document extract, which on reading it challenges core aspects of safety thinking and human factors.
The expectation of pilots’ abilities in situation assessment, knowledge recall, judgement and decision making is not supported by evidence from incidents and accidents.
Arguing the point to absurdity, then remove PWS because its not required (but reactive is) - all pilots will manage, all situations, all of the time - not so.
Human performance is limited, also influenced by inappropriate training or publications.
Not only have the vendor / manufacturer introduced doubt about the effectiveness of a safety system, so too regulators who apparently condone the text.
‘PWS doesn't tell you’ anything, that’s your interpretation, your mental model, part of situation assessment, part of the judgement process in decision making. Citing the specific hypothetical situation #1, is irrelevant because as previously argued that situation should (ideally) not be encountered - situation awareness again, thinking ahead, considering possible outcomes.
‘A few seconds’; in the Air Zim incident #5, the time between indications being detectable and understood, followed by very swift and correct action, was 20 secs. What is ‘a few’ relative to 20; how fast might we think, or think we can think with the surprise of an unexpected alert (if the alert was not unexpected why are we there).
After Air Zim the industry debated if PWS could have detected this form of downburst any quicker - possibly a simultaneous alert and reactive warning after ‘a few seconds’. The limitation considered a rapidly forming cell and downburst, above the aircraft - descending flight path, and at close range (high scan angle).
Encountering the same situation at one of the susceptible airports doesn't provide time for evaluation; the document provides ‘get out’ statements, requiring pilots’ awareness, etc. Poor safety management requiring pilots to manage a weak system, yet where pilots are subsequently judged wrong, they are blamed because ‘we told you so’.
A useful safety technique is to have a ‘pre-mortem’ assessment; like a post-mortem but before the event - ‘what if’, identify the double-bind, catch 22.