As facts or assertions about factual matters about Forkner's words and actions have been disclosed, and as the overall series of events and communications in these matters has become more clearly known, a possible connection between some aspects of the overall story has seemed intriguing. With these latest revelations as well as what this SLF/att'y takes as a deep and wide consensus among the pilot community that Forkner indisputably is being made a scapegoat, I'm going to suggest a possible connection.
It is pretty well-established, is it not, that Southwest did not want the MAX to involve any simulator training time, that this issue was part of its collective bargaining situation, that there were significant financial penalties involved if Boeing did not deliver, and - though I haven't kept current with the lawsuit SWA's pilots' labor organization brought against Boeing - that Boeing made a series of direct representations to Southwest about fulfilling these conditions. And then, Forkner ended up being employed by Southwest, for a time after he left Boeing.
The very central role that Southwest's conditions for the 737 MAX played in the overall progession of events with the aircraft should be significantly helpful to the defense, perhaps very significantly helpful. That is, when looking for ways to describe and to place in context the "larger picture of responsibility" beyond what Mr. Forkner said and did (and what he omitted), the defense need look only as far as Southwest's conditions for the 737 MAX. And if legal counsel was thinking in a sufficiently anticipatory manner, during his stint at the airline, much groundwork could have been set in place by Mr. Forkner. Of course the Southwest portion of the overall 737 MAX debacles is just one such portion, but with Mr. Forkner's immediately successive employment there, it would appear to be one portion, at least, of the larger picture of responsibility which would be comparatively easy to put into evidence.