Are the causes of GE's break-up sufficiently comparable to the causes of Boeing's current dire straits? Saying "poor management and direction", or "bad management and direction", is so general that it doesn't prove they are comparable. ("poor" meaning, you scored 9 on a scale of 90; "bad" meaning you scored poorly plus you got ejected for the next several rounds of competition for misconduct - Boeing of course has both kinds of indictments at present)
Perhaps it will make a significant difference that some time back, Boeing brought in - or at least it said it was doing so - more Board-level experience with the Navy nuclear enterprise. I don't think people with successful careers in nuclear-powered ships in the USN have a bean-counter mentality. The "safety culture" problems couldn't possibly be solved overnight, regardless of what changes are made at the Board and in senior management. (I'm leaving for another day various wild and crazy thoughts about complicity amongst and between certain senior managerial types, and lawyers for the company of various stripes. It was all Forkner's fault, wasn't it?)
About the future prospects of the 787, as just an SLF/attorney, I wonder what the boards of directors of the airlines currently operating the 787 - let's just finesse the situation and say "operating it at levels commensurate with before the pandemic" - would have to say if they ever spoke publicly about seeing the demise of the company, and an inglorious and abrupt end to the aircraft program, as inevitable. Before responsible people call something quits, if the purpose the "something" was supposed to serve still exists and is valid, don't you need "something else" to take its place first? Or is it the case that Airbus can ramp up to a huge extent A350 production and assembly, without delay, difficulties or undue expense?