Hawk Risk Register - Fatigue Risk and mitigations
According to the multitude of media reports from the inquest, there has been a lot of generalised stuff about fatigue, referenced to Reds pilots.
SI - Page 1.4.70 (
1.4.301.)
"The Sqn Chain of Command (CoC) maintained oversight of personnel fatigue .... The only time that a senior pilot had seen R3 fatigued was 2 weeks before the accident ..... . On that occasion R3 had removed himself from flying. "
SI XX204 Conclusions Page 1.4.102
"1.4.473. The Panel determined that when considered collectively it was very likely that R3 was, to a degree, fatigued, ... "
Contributory factors Page 1.1.103
g. ...
"The pilot's working routine was detrimentally affecting his morale, not allowing him sufficient time for rest, consolidation and affecting his fatigue levels."
h. ... "Pilot fatigue." ****************************
...
According to an historic Hawk Risk Register, two fatigue risks had been identified, which required specific mitigation to become Low and Tolerable and ALARP.
I can find no mention in the SI of these specific risks or of the required mitigations.
They were referred to in 2012 as
'Cumulative fatigue' (RED/CFIT-PILINC/02) and
'Fatigue' (RED/STFBS/01. Those responsible were listed as the DDH and the Wg Cdr RAFAT.
Are these risks and mitigations still valid and in force ?
Are these issues included in the coroner's reference to
'breaches in duties' ?
LFH
...