This is a multi faceted issue. the 2 year rotation is a weakness but it could also be a bonus, in that if you get a complete bell-end in post or as your boss, you know they will be gone in due course.
The real issue here is that DE&S has no commercial imperative to get the job done efficiently and effectively. I have witnessed first hand, comments from those in the sheds at Bristol, 'That's 5 year's work that is'. They are career civil servants with little reward or imperative for doing the job well and equally, no implications for getting it wrong. Most of them would have been sacked in a commercial organisation. Many a time those contractors say they could do the job tomorrow, on cost and on time but they are often the ones who throw the towel in from frustration or do not get selected in favour of the lowest compliant bid. I realise I am generalising here but the report and those that were written before it, right back to the days of Samuel Pepys, shows that Military procurement is broken and only during times of crisis, when the bureaucracy, prevarication, delay and stubbornness of those civil servants can be bypassed, do projects like SeaKing ASaCS get delivered. There will be many of those VSOs and others who were totally frustrated in their efforts to do the right thing.
I seem to recall a suggestion that procurement be given to the likes of KPMG or Deloittes. Sack the lot of them and bring it on.
Edited: I did recall it in Bernard Gray's report
Bernard Gray has set out a number of options for the future of DE&S: the status quo, a trading fund, an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body (ENDPB) with a private sector partner and a Government-Owned Contractor-Operated organisation (GoCo). These options were presented to Minister in December 2011
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https://publications.parliament.uk/p...dfence/9/9.pdf