Originally Posted by
Easy Street
the fundamental problem is the mismatch between aspiration and resource.
All true. But the problem is also that no committee (PAC, HCDC, etc.) ever takes the next step, setting out what's meant to happen, and what actually happens.
Who has the aspirations, and who makes materiel and financial provision (the resource)? And what is the mechanism by which they speak to each other, and produce a viable equipment programme (or whatever it's called this week)?
It may surprise some that both are Service jobs. Nothing to do with procurers, who are given the output. Importantly, if you have not done at least one of these jobs (as a civilian or serviceman) BEFORE being promoted to the most junior grade in procurement, you are at a distinct disadvantage. This is the answer to the question I posed above on ASaC Mk7. The PM had done both jobs many years before as a sprog, and was able to cope with the RN's HQ withdrawing all support from the programme, and around 60% of it being unendorsed or funded. (Think about that). The pivotal point in the programme was DOR(Sea) inviting the PM to act as RN Customer 2, with authority to speak for the RN, and state its requirement.
So, the system can work, but you need to avoid parachuting people into unfamiliar posts based on their rank or status. Chinook Mk3 is a good example. Nimrod MRA4 was slightly different. The correct people were there, they were just ignored, as rank can never be wrong. And there is a tendency to forget that a civilian engineering project manager is required to be able to do EVERY job in the team, but this is not applied to servicemen or non-engineers. Again, there is a disconnect between this rule and reality, with the ASaC job perhaps being the last example on a major programme.
Having accepted the evidence of all this, Mr Haddon-Cave's recommendations were excellent, although mostly mandated policy anyway. One day MoD will get round to implementing them, but not soon.