Originally Posted by
SLXOwft
From line one of the USNI report of the investigation's findings onwards, it's is clear it was a systemic failure leading to 'an inability to extinguish the fire'. I infer that failure was caused by those at many levels of the chain of command failing to discharge their duties including ensuring their juniors were aware of, and capable of performing theirs. To me that smacks of the VSOs tolerating a slack safety culture. It remains to be seen if punishment is inflicted at the top and corrective training lower down.
Exactly this. The arsonist may have set the fire, but the institutional failure to train and prepare for a relatively likely occurrence (fire) on board the vessel was the reason for the loss. The report is a damning catalogue of complacency, confusion and missteps. This is not about blame, it's about accountability. The fact that this happened just 8 years after a nuclear submarine was written off in exactly the same circumstances, and the subsequent Navy manual for avoiding a repeat performance was either ignored or not correctly disseminated should be grounds enough for some career limiting actions.