From line one of the USNI report of the investigation's findings onwards, it's is clear it was a systemic failure leading to 'an inability to extinguish the fire'. I infer that failure was caused by those at many levels of the chain of command failing to discharge their duties including ensuring their juniors were aware of, and capable of performing theirs. To me that smacks of the VSOs tolerating a slack safety culture. It remains to be seen if punishment is inflicted at the top and corrective training lower down.
A cascade of failures – from a junior enlisted sailor not recognizing a fire at the end of their duty watch to fundamental problems with how the U.S. Navy trains sailors to fight fires in shipyards – are responsible for the five-day blaze that cost the service an amphibious warship
Although the fire was started by an act of arson, the ship was lost due to an inability to extinguish the fire,” Conn wrote in his investigation, which was completed in April and reviewed by USNI News this week.
“In the 19 months executing the ship’s maintenance availability, repeated failures allowed for the accumulation of significant risk and an inadequately prepared crew, which led to an ineffective fire response.”
The training and readiness of the ship’s crew were deficient. They were unprepared to respond. Integration between the ship and supporting shore-based firefighting organizations was inadequate
Trite I know, 'fail to prepare and you prepare to fail'. It would appear there was a failure to keep damage control training and awareness up to the appropriate levels and standards proscribed. Complacency kills and looses ships. The USN Damage Controlman training used to, and I expect still does include instuctions to practice in port damage control scenarios. I don't know if this regularly includes preparing for maintenance periods with minimal crew.