Very good point lame.
When should a near miss be determined to be a near miss?
Why should we even take account of "near misses" since they are not system breakdowns, unless of course you figure that being able to see another aircraft is a system failure. Particularly when you define a near miss as being within 5 miles with less than 1000ft vertical separation.
Is it not irrelevant to consider some very generous arbitrary figure beyond which one is considered to be safe? How does one manage to travel along the highway with this concept firmly implanted upon one's mind?
Perhaps the problem is that under the old system the concept of safety was a bit too academic and not enough common sense, a bit too restrictive without a corresponding safety benefit.
Strange to think that a more restrictive system could actually be less efficient and safe isn't it. Nevertheless, it is true, and it is embodied in the Air Force definition of airmanship, "The safe and efficient operation of an aircraft, both in the air and on the ground."
Notice that neither safety or efficiency are given emphasis. In fact, safety and efficiency are complimentary. The reason why that is true is related to human factors. And since you are no doubt fully aware of human behaviour patterns, I am sure you'll be able to understand why it is so.
In fact, it was more like Yes Minister when the BASI report was used to justify ATC and permit the absolution of responsibility by airline pilots to see and avoid other aircraft. The NAS actually seeks to reduce the bureaucratic control of pilots by ATC and hand back responsibility for separation while in VMC to the pilots.
I find it hard to understand why anyone would not be willing to accept more responsibility if it also allowed them greater flexibility and efficiency, unless of course you couldn't care less about efficiency, just your own well-being. But that couldn't be right, could it?
Life's a bitch, then you fly!
