Investigation Report cat.2: simplified format report, adapted to the circumstances of the event and to the issues of the investigation.
During the arrival briefing for the Hyères-Le Palyvestre aerodrome, the crew chose to favour the ILS approach for runway 05, as the landing performance in the conditions of the day allowed it. The crew mentioned the presence of a tailwind in connection with the landing performance and not with the approach path. Other threats such as wind shear and the possible presence of birds on the airfield were of greater concern to the crew.
During the first contact with the Toulon approach controller, the crew selected the altitude of 1,900 ft on the Flight Control Unit (FCU) in accordance with the instruction received.
During the descent, the controller reported to the crew that the weather conditions were "a bit tight" for runway 23, which in the crew's mind meant that the minima would not have allowed them to complete this approach. The crew knew they were above the glide path and therefore had the speedbrakes down and then the landing gear down.
When the controller offered the crew a holding pattern to descend, the crew elected to continue the straight-in approach for Runway 05. The PF was aware that he still had the option of aborting the approach in the absence of stabilization at 1,000 ft and the PM followed the PF's advice. However, the crew underestimated the influence that the tailwind could have on the approach path and did not sufficiently assess the feasibility of overtaking the plane.
Subsequently, both crew members were attentive to the evolution of the indicated airspeed, but did not take into account the high values of the ground speed and vertical speed. Catching up with the glide path increased the crew's workload, and the high ground speed due to the strong tailwind reduced the time required to reach the runway. These two factors resulted in the pilots losing situational awareness. The crew did not realize that the selected FCU altitude was still 1,900 ft and then did not detect the aircraft leveling off at that altitude and the associated FMA mode changes.
The leveling off moved the aircraft away from the 3° glide path and resulted in the interception of the ILS secondary lobe on a 9° plane. During this period, the crew finished configuring the aircraft for landing and performed the landing checklist.
The interception of the secondary lobe of the ILS caused an increase in attitude up to 30° without being perceived by the crew, then the activation of the Low energy alert, the activation of the incidence protections and a decrease in speed. The Low energy alert was triggered 1 min 25 min after the undetected activation of the ALT* mode, during which time the crew's actions showed a loss of situational awareness. The PF reacted by applying TOGA thrust without announcing it to the PM and by reducing the attitude. The crew then performed a go-around and the second approach was uneventful.