As ever, the assumption that the carrier exists in isolation from other naval forces, and has the sole mission of hitting targets on land, bugs me. You may be interested in
this comment from Not.A.boffin over on the ARRSE CVF and Carrier Strike thread:
All the requirements studies of the mid-90s and beyond - including the supporting high-level and detailed operational analysis that supported the Staff Requirement Dossier for the project - included defence of maritime forces and forces ashore from an air threat.
The sortie generation studies and requirements all included air defence as well.
Also the comments
here. Remember the carrier is critical for ASW operations too.
The HSC Fire and Ice paper has a scenario of Putin seeking conflict in the Baltics/Scandinavia to distract his population from economic failings and the crackdown on personal freedoms.
...there is likely to be a fierce initial local engagement, followed by a lull, which in turn would – assuming mediation and other countermeasures failed – develop into a decisive larger engagement. In this context, reinforcements from the US brought in along NATO’s SLOC would be vital.
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From a maritime perspective, the Kremlin’s assessment in the near-future conflict we are examining would, therefore, likely be as follows:
• The Alliance lacks the peacetime ground force strength in Europe to dislodge Russian occupation forces from their positions without substantial reinforcements from the US which are only practical to bring in by sea: disruption of seaborne reinforcements (SLOC interdiction) and related action is therefore desirable to aid in the wider effort to forestall an offensive.
• NATO is militarily and politically vulnerable to long-range conventional weapons launched from or transiting through the northern flank/maritime domain: the threat or reality of strikes against the Alliance’s rear area may contribute to halting the conflict on acceptable terms.
• Defending Russia’s maritime approaches is crucial for both homeland defence and the provision/protection of the SSBN arm of the strategic nuclear deterrent: every effort must be made to defend the maritime approaches and mainland Russia
As a counter to Russian strategies of interdiction the Atlantic SLOCs it suggests deploying a NATO ASW task group into the GIUK gap early on, consisting of one of our carriers and the normal frigates and destroyers, SSN, and RFAs, and a force of NATO frigates, destroyers, and SSKs. NATO carriers, including ours, are also key to the response to Russian forces striking NATO points of vulnerability.