Originally Posted by
ORAC
I don’t think flight capacity into and out of Kabul is the problem, it’s more than adequate. The bottlenecks are before and after.
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They are trying to arrange other transfer points in the Gulf, in the meantime man6 flights are no routing direct to Ramstein - reducing load and vastly extending the total turn round time till they get back again.
I understand that; my thought was aimed mainly at addressing the "after" bottleneck in Qatar, although I accept that could just as well be handled by transferring pax directly from one aircraft to another at the 'Deid (wouldn't that be preferable to a holding facility, even if it meant partial loads being flown?). That still leaves the "before" bottleneck. Hopefully those people have some means of communication by which off-airport RVs, authentication and rotary transfer can be arranged; I'm wondering if supporting that activity isn't a better use of inbound C-17 capacity than bringing in more troops?
As for Rory Stewart, his analysis fails to recognise the former government's loss of legitimacy through rampant corruption, and the establishment of Taliban shadow governance throughout the entire countryside. 10% turnout at the 2019 elections and huge, unsustainable ANDSF losses. The Kabul government was going to fall, its leadership was going to escape to safety and the Taliban was going to flip all the regional factions, which is why neither side had any interest in reaching a deal in the Doha talks. The suggestion that the West could have continued to prop up the status quo at low cost is a disingenuous one, and little short of (benign) imperialism.