Originally Posted by
NWSRG
surely there is no doubt that a sustained presence would have prevented this meltdown.
I'm afraid there is very much doubt over that. A sustained Western presence would have caused suffering in other ways. From
the most recent SIGAR report:
RS [RESOLUTE SUPPORT] reported 2,035 civilian casualties in April and May 2021, which included 705 deaths and 1,330 injuries. This total is nearly as high as the three months from January through March 2021 (2,149). According to RS, the top two causes of civilian casualties were improvised explosive devices and direct fire (e.g., rifle or machine-gun fire). As seen in Figure 2.31, these civilian casualties were nearly as high as the entire three month period last year (April–June 2020).
RS attributed about 93% of this quarter’s civilian casualties to antigovernment forces (40% to the Taliban, 38% to unknown insurgents, 14% to IS-K,
and less than 1% to the Haqqani Network), as seen in Figure 2.30. About 2% were attributed to progovernment forces (2% to ANDSF), and about 5% to other or unknown forces. These percentages are roughly similar to long-term trends reported by RS
I've said it earlier in the thread, there was no 'stay' option. The Taliban was progressively taking control of the country, its tax revenues and the home villages of ANDSF members. In short they were winning. The level of civilian casualties was not 'low cost'. The level of ANDSF casualties was not 'low cost', so much so that the numbers have been classified for a couple of years now. The choices were to escalate in order to pause (never mind reverse) the Taliban's progress, or to get out. Both options end with the scenes we see today; the first option merely kicks it down the road and kills more people by prolonging the fighting.
The only* realistic way of avoiding today's scenes was a negotiated peaceful transition to a power-sharing arrangement with the Taliban. The time for that was some years ago, when the Kabul government still held a fig leaf of credibility and the West had tens of thousands of troops in place with no pre-announced timetable for withdrawal. A paradox of negotiation is that you should compromise when at your strongest. Unfortunately Ghani refused to consider it.
* In a limited sense, there is perhaps one other way, which is that US government departments could have paid earlier heed to the intent of their elected Presidents and drawn down their personnel numbers sooner so that the scale of the final airlift could have been smaller.
Edit: same arguments made
here.