Originally Posted by
Chugalug2
f 900 :-
"The System" most definitely didn't work as it was designed to. Having identified the "several major issues" BD was ignored and then briefed against. The strength of the system as designed is that no one person can subvert it, thanks to the many checks and counter checks. When Controller Air submitted the Interim Use only CAR (which you correctly state prohibited flight for any purpose, other than testing of course) at the request of the RAF, it was ACAS who then issued a caveated RTS, releasing the type into squadron service. He would have been stopped from doing so if such an action was contrary to what had been agreed upon at the highest levels. Why would they feel compelled to agree to do so then? Nobody knows, because none of them have ever been asked! No investigation into the illegal RTS has ever been made. The RAF Provost Marshall was given evidence of this and chose not to reply, never mind to act. My guess would be the primacy of getting the Mk2s back into supporting the Army in NI ASAP, but that is just my guess.
I'm afraid that we need to keep our eyes on the woods here, rather than concentrating on particular trees, be they the Chinook HC2 RTS, Nimrod Mk2 fuel systems, Hercules C1 ESF, Tornado IFF, Hawk MB Mk 10 seat, Sea King Mk 7 HISLs. etc. The woods are the original subversion of the UK Military Air Safety System in the 80s/90s and the subsequent cover up ever since. That was all perpetrated by RAF VSOs at the highest levels. Left to their own devices they will always throw a man overboard (even lesser VSOs) in order to save themselves. There needs to be an independent inquiry into this scandal. Then maybe the need for an independent UK Military Air Regulator and a UK Military Air Accident Investigator, of the MOD and of each other, might finally be acted upon and much life and treasure saved as a result.
Chug,
You seem to have applied a rather narrow and literal interpretation to my last post, en route to your attempt to detract from it, which I am struggling to understand as we seem to have reached similar conclusions and are saying similar things.
I am very much concentrating on the "woods", but do feel that there is a particular tree which could beneficially be shaken to illustrate the central strand of the issue.
Let me try again in plain, simple terms.
A seemingly sane, rational, experienced individual finds themselves in a position of responsibility and seniority. They fully understand their position and responsibilities, having worked towards them throughout their career, a career which they hope / anticipate has yet greater heights to reach. Their responsibilities include authorising the Release To Service of aircraft, a recognised and critical protection, signifying, in simple terms, that the aircraft is "safe" to be transferred to squadrons for operational use.
Along comes Chinook Mk2, by which time the project is late, over budget, and to put it mildly a known problem child. The individual has had no personal involvement in the project hitherto, so bears no personal responsibility for the problems up to that point. In seeking to discharge his duties responsibly, he decides to ignore the rumours and gossip, and familiarises himself with the body of written materials and opinion. A very clear picture emerges of serious and multiple safety critical issues, and no amount of rose tinted spectacles can transform it into a positive one.
The obvious path is to decline to issue a RTS pending resolution of the issues. Whilst every RTS will be made with some degree of residual safety risk remaining, the Chinook Mk2 residual risk was overwhelming, and could not be glossed over. It would not have required a huge degree of insight or imagination to realise that this was the correct and logical course of action.
So why wasnt it followed?
There seem to be only two possible reasons.
1) The individual saw an opportunity to win Kudos for himself by "solving" the problem at the stroke of a pen, providing much needed helicopter capacity to the line in the process.
2) He was ordered to do it.
Acting off his own bat in the particular circumstances seems a step too far given the extent of the risks, and the number of people in the know. The decision to restrict the scope of the RTS to basically preclude flying the aircraft is both a clue to his acting on orders, and one of the most cynical acts I have come across for some time. Whilst providing a line of defence should the worst happen (as of course it did, in short order) it was well understood that once the aircraft arrived with squadrons, it would be flown, the small print in the RTS being unknown / overlooked. An embarassing procurement saga could morph into a business as usual tidy up of the aircraft in service, with the odd crash here and there being swept under the carpet and likely explained as operationally related. Nothing to see here, move along....
The subsequent cover up and smearing of the pilots in this incident would surely not have been undertaken just to protect a lone officer who made a poor decision for his own ends? They only make sense in the context of his having been ordered to grant the RTS, and a full scale circling of the wagons being needed to protect those involved.
In my view, having this individuals actions examined under oath offers an opportunity to expose the whole rotten mess in black and white. The particular dramatis personae of this case have all now left the scene, but the repercussions would likely be felt by their successors. This particular tree would shed a lot of light on the wood.