There have been many discussions in this thread of the Chinook Mk2’s Release to Service (RTS). However, I don’t think anyone has mentioned how new the whole idea of an RTS was in 1994. I had first-hand experience of its introduction, and I thought my experiences might help inform this discussion.
Around 1992, what was then the MoD Procurement Executive (the (PE)) created a team to look at how aircraft were being cleared and released to service. They did this because it was apparent that it was being done in a wide variety of ways, and this was (correctly) judged to be a risk to safety. Some aircraft fleets used the CA Release as their primary reference, some used the Aircrew Manual, some used both, and everybody handled in service modifications differently. Led by a quite excellent MoD civil servant, the team produced what was known as the ‘GARP’ report – with the passing of years I’m no longer sure what that stood for, but they set out a new system for preparing what was called the ‘Release to Service’ - the RTS. In 1993, I was starting a new job as the Harrier Fleet Engineering Manager within what was then Director General Aircraft (Navy) (DGA(N). Reporting to a highly experienced and capable Commander Air Engineer, my small team was tasked with producing the Navy’s first RTS, for the Sea Harrier FRS1.
We started with the aircraft’s CA Release (CAR) as issued by Controller Aircraft (PE). By then, under GARP guidance, the CARs were being issued in a standardised format with information clearly presented in relevant sections. This formed the backbone of the RTS. We then prepared another section that listed all the Service Modifications that had been cleared by DGA(N). We then ensured that a copy of the current Service Deviation for each mod was added. And that was basically it. Except for a lot of work.
My boss, and the engineer Captain above him made it clear that my job was to assume nothing and make sure that the whole RTS was fully supported by evidence. For each Service Modification my team had to refer to advice from Boscombe and the aircraft DA and present a justification for clearance for service. For some long-standing Service Mods dating back to the Falklands that still weren’t in the CAR, this was a long job. We also worked with the RN’s air staff officers - experienced Sea Harrier aircrew. My team’s work was carefully reviewed by my Commander, then very formally reviewed by our Captain and then finally presented to our Admiral, DGA(N) himself – another air engineer officer - who signed it off. One thing I should make clear – at no stage was I pressured to include or exclude anything in the RTS. I was expected to produce a safe and operationally suitable RTS, fully supported by relevant evidence. It took time, but we got there, and when a short while later we had to repeat the process for the Sea Harrier FA2 RTS, we were in good shape.
The reason I’ve bored you all with this stuff is this – I can think of no possible universe in which my Commander, let alone my Captain and definitely NOT my Admiral, would have let me present an RTS that wasn’t supported by a fully cleared CA Release and which contained whole blank sections for safety critical systems. Let me be clear about this – I was just a joe Lt Cdr engineer, but I knew what was expected of me, and I would never have even thought of doing such a thing. Nor would any of my FAA counterparts.
Another observation. Some of you might have noted that the Sea Harrier RTS was being signed by a VSO who was an engineer. This was normal Navy practice – the RTS was (in my view correctly) considered to be a technically based and derived document and preparing and approving it was a job for engineers, not aircrew. Another reason for this was to ensure that operational pressures did not unduly influence RTS preparation and approval. In the case of the Chinook it was signed off by ACAS – an aircrew officer. I wonder what systems and procedures his staffs had for preparing the Chinook’s RTS? I wonder if they were technically competent to do that job? Were they shielded, like I was, from pressure from senior officers? And could what happened to the Chinook Mk2 RTS still be happening today on another platform? Perhaps out there in ‘SF Land’, where all sorts of stuff apparently gets ‘bolted on’?
Anyway, I hope this is food for thought. Best Regards as ever to all those good folk working hard out there to get the kit into service safely and effectively.
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 20th Jul 2021 at 12:26.