Originally Posted by
Old-Duffer
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The publication of the book “Inconvenient Truth” (ICT) has reopened this exceptionally divisive chapter in the air force’s history. I have now divided the matter into two ‘compartments’: one deals with the physical events of June 1994 and the other the events before/afterwards.
I am minded to believe that the flight crew were in error but to what degree, I am not competent to say. As to the events afterwards, the complexities are too difficult and contradictory (if one steps beyond ICT to the other side of the coin) to make a sensible judgement, not having a balanced account of the facts.
The one thing I am certain in my mind about (and knowing some of the personalities involved) is that I don’t believe the many and often abusive comments levelled at these officers, suggesting some sort of massive collusion, is justified.
Old Duffer
I would never deny anyone their right to an opinion. But, one or two points require a response.
Firstly, to compartmentalise before/after and the accident itself is to ignore the legal obligation the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff was under (confirmed by Lord Philip, and subsequently conceded by MoD) that the aircraft was not to be relied upon in any way. Until one accepts that known fact, no serious discussion is possible.
‘Collusion’ is ‘a secret agreement or cooperation especially for an illegal or deceitful purpose’.
To believe there has been no collusion is to reject the written evidence reproduced in the book and its sequel. In turn, that implies these letters are somehow forgeries.
For example, the Chief of the Air Staff wrote to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy saying the aircraft was ‘off course by some miles’. The Board, and even the senior Reviewing Officers, had never said this, yet none demurred. CAS must have appreciated this timely cooperation.
The RAF consistently stated that the fuel computer software was not safety critical. When asked, MoD refused to produce the relevant policy directive, so it was sent to Lord Philip separately. Law Lords tend to accept documented evidence – it makes their job so much easier. That outright lie was both deceitful and illegal. The truth would have immediately cast overwhelming doubt on the safety of the negligence findings; in addition to offering a plausible cause of the accident, be it directly or indirectly.
If I could inject some humour. The ludicrous letter to the media in January 2010 from the then CAS, stating that the ‘positively dangerous’ status of the FADEC software implementation was ‘well known at the time’, is straight from a Brian Rix farce. Thanks for that confirmation CAS, that your predecessors knew it was dangerous yet signed the RTS telling aircrew it was safe. As he clearly knew none of the facts, who agreed to cooperate and mislead him? When the facts were revealed to him the following day, did he take action? No? Then he colluded with others to protect those who lied.
I leave the best to last. When the Chinook airworthiness report of 1992 was revealed in 2011, the RAF Chief Engineer at the time claimed it did not mention Chinook Mk2. It did, 284 times. Not exactly a minor or easily missed typo. Yet the Air Staff then briefed Dr Liam Fox to repeat the lie. When told the truth, Fox had the decency to retract. Again, what action was taken about a Minister being misled, causing him to mislead Parliament?
That’s a lot of people not colluding, yet telling the same lies. Who benefited?