For those commenting before reading the book, the chapter in question is entitled 'A pattern of behaviour', and discusses the common factors between the Sean Cunningham, Mike Harland and Simon Burgess accidents.
The Top Latch Plunger issue relates to the Harland case, and the relevant extract is:
"The Top Latch Plunger, holding the seat in position until fired, had been incorrectly engaged. The assembly consists of a plunger element and a spring-loaded spigot running through its centre. (Figure 9). At the Inquest, on 19 October 2010, the pilot confirmed aircrew were expected to check this locking mechanism during pre-flight checks. But, he understood it was only necessary to ensure the spigot was correctly aligned. That, he and 40 other civilian and military Tornado aircrew he had canvassed did not know to also check the end of the plunger was flush with its housing. Only two people he asked knew this. But two is enough to indicate the correct instructions were provided by Martin-Baker. (In the same way groundcrew from Lossiemouth and Coningsby knew how to fit the Drogue Shackle nut correctly)".
So, if questioning the statement, might I suggest you speak to the pilot who gave evidence under oath.
The similarity with the Cunningham case is that MoD claimed a lack of information. The 'Figure 9' referred to reproduces a sectioned diagram of the assembly, provided by Martin Baker to MoD. It shows the "correct (plunger fully home)" plunger position, and an "incorrect (plunger not fully home)" position. BV, you may even have used it when training aircrew.
As with the Cunningham case, the book merely reproduces the information MoD says it does not have - sourced directly from MoD documents.
This repeats Chinook ZD576, Nimrod XV230, Hercules XV179, Sea Kings ASaC Mk7, and so on and on.
I say again. MoD lied.
Last edited by tucumseh; 30th Jun 2021 at 12:21.