Originally Posted by
LOMCEVAK
I think that the RAF Hawk accident was due to the ailerons not being connected at all. Subsequently they introduced a procedure whereby the starter crew indicated control deflections to the pilot during the after start control checks.
One problem related to cockpit control checks is that some control surfaces are not visible from the cockpit, especially elevator and rudder trim tabs. The only way that you can then check these is during the pre-flight walkround having set full trim deflection first. However, this requires careful thought because the tab will deflect in the opposite direction to a control surface and will require you to go back to the cockpit to then set the opposite direction. Also, if an aircraft has a mechanically linked nosewheel steering system then full rudder checks can only be performed whilst taxiing and that is not the time to look over your shoulder at the rudder, which possibly you cannot see anyhow. So, there are a few practicalities which do require robust engineering procedures and pilot observations cannot always be used as a mitigation.
There is one interesting control reversal issue that does occur and that is for a pilot from a three-axis control aircraft flying a weighshift microlight (and vice versa). The pedals will generate a yaw rate in the opposite direction for each of these classes. Whilst low gain tasks such as taxiing can be performed with conscious decisions, correction of an uncommanded yaw disturbance during take-off and landing can result in the pilot making an unconscious skill-based pedal input in the wrong direction.
I recall the Hawk prang, early/mid 1996, and yes, disconnected ailerons.
I've a lot of hours in both 3-axis and flexwing microlights, and have had no significant issues, nor have almost anybody I know - it's essentially a non-issue with qualified pilots, because (a) training, and (b) they are SO different, it's essentially like going between a car and a bicycle. Also on a flexwing both the nosewheel steering pedals and lateral control through the bar work in the same push-left-turn-right sense.
I do know of one accident, a flexwing instructional flight out of Barton in 2011 where a student was being instructed in PFLs, and close to the ground pulled instead of pushed on the go-around, causing it to dive into the ground, thankfully survivably. The fundamental issue there was out of sequence training - the instructor introduced a relatively stressed and risky manoeuver incorrectly early in the syllabus, before his student was adequately familiar with basic handling.
However, if you really want an exercise in pilot confusion, you want to fly a JC24b Weedhopper. Stick in the conventional 3-axis sense, nosewheel steering in the flexwing/bicycle sense. I have a few hours in one, and managed (somewhat uniquely for the type) never to bend it, but the fact that your stick (actually rudder control, there are no ailerons but lots of dihedral) is push-right-roll-right, whilst the pedals are push-right-turn-left-on-the-ground is deeply anti-intuitive. I resolved it by locking the lateral stick on the ground and steering on pedals along, then when airborne locking the pedals centrally, and steering with the stick only. NOT the easiest aeroplane ever to land. Using stick and pedals at the same time, I had concluded very early on, was just going to end in tears if I tried.
I have over the years been involved in investigating a number of accidents where pilots of larger (say 172 sized) aeroplanes broke 3-axis microlights, despite identical control senses, because the speeds, attitudes and key heights were different. At one point I was flying regularly (purely for my pleasure and enjoyment) a Thruster TST 3-axis microlight, a Raven flexwing microlight, and a PA28-161. The switch that gave me concern was between the PA28 and Thruster, for just this reason: particularly in the landing, the controls worked the same way, but all of the heights, speeds and visual attitudes were totally different.
G