Two words...
Haddon Cave.
To all those that ask why we need two Gp Capts it is a result of the fallout from the Haddon Cave report.
Someone has to be accountable nowadays and the structure they fit into is the Duty Holder (DH) construct. The Senior DH is CAS. The Operational DH is the relevant AOC. The Delivery DH is a Gp Capt and is usually the Stn Cdr.
In simple terms when risks are identified someone has to be the grown up who is responsible for holding that risk and would be the person in court at any subsequent inquest. They need to prove they have taken all meaningful steps to minimise risks. If the Stn Cdr doesn’t have the authority or budget to minimise a risk it gets pushed up the chain. Tornado Collision Avoidance System is a good example of when an identified risk gets elevated due to budgetary restraints.
So, when a Stn Cdr has a requirement to be responsible for the risks associated with operating an aircraft it just isn’t possible (argue all you like but I’ll never agree with you) for a non aircrew person to assume that role.
Take Coningsby as an example. Would you really expect an Admin Branch Gp Capt to be the person responsible for the safe delivery of Typhoon Operations? When a new risk is identified would that individual have the knowledge and authority to decide how best to manage that risk and ultimately sit in a court of law to defend themselves?
The Admin Branch Gp Capt is absolutely capable of running a station but I will never believe that they could be a suitable DDH. Hence the two Gp Capts when required.
I realise it’s not a system that existed in the RAF of yesteryear so some people will struggle with accepting it. However, I happen to think that the Air Safety world and the DH construct (despite the initial resistance of everybody!) is a vast improvement on what came before.
BV