rg
Thank you for the response; differing views are opportunities to learn and alter understandings in an uncertain world.
In a safe industry there are fewer accidents. Also it is difficult to identify meaningful similarities if any exist at all; most correlations are about ill-defined human behaviour in complex situations.
Choosing to fix the man - training, tends towards an extreme; conversely we should not over commit to technology because humans are still involved, although at different points in time, design, certification and operation.
The issue is how to achieve a suitable balance after an event, and thus before the next one.
‘
Beggars belief’; beware hidden assumptions, that all crews will have sufficient knowledge, understand situations and behave similarly. The second Max example illustrates Boeing’s thinking, an assumption that crews’ will understand and have time to act in situations as imagined, we should not think the same - ‘
this is how we learn’.
The apparent inability to fly - our perception, erroneously concluding that this is due to reduced skill might hide other problems, or create new problems by inappropriate action. Situation awareness has greater influence than manual skill; situations involve distraction, ambiguity, time constraint, recall of knowledge.
After an accident we can find whatever we look for; the skills required to avoid this involve how we achieve a balanced view, avoiding extremes, and considering alternative points of view. This applies particularly to designers and safety regulators.
NASA:-
http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.full.pdf
“
We found that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.”
Other publications about thinking: -
https://ta-tutor.com/sites/ta-tutor....ts/thinkng.pdf
http://scpsystem.weebly.com/uploads/...s_thinking.pdf