Hi Pineteam
The classics are lf course AF 447 - airplane perfectly flyable but ended up in the sea. Tragic. Not an easy one to handle but that's why we spent all those years training for it. QF32 is different in that it was a potentially a catastrophe in the making, very difficult to manage, but due to the skill of the pilots, working for a first class airline, they landed safely. Two extremes really.
When I heard that the Max had crashed in Lionair I just thought - another Indonesian airline (commonplace then with most of them banned in Europe ) and I thought "why didn't they carry out the IAS unreliable procedure and then the RUNAWAY STAB procedure. Boeing said the same and simply issued an AD saying do the procedure and reminding all pilots of it. . ET5 months later, I felt no excuse now - they had been pre- warned and did exactly the same thing. But then I heard USA pilots in Delta and Southwest saying that they too were unaware , not of MCAS which is a red herring because there are four causes of runaway stab, all of which will run the stabiliser for ten seconds (short circuit in the motor, AP, mach trim, speed trim) but they had not been trained in any great detail in handling runaway stab. What? US pilots not well trained? My alarm bells went off. What is happening to the gold standard of FAA/USA/EASA training if AF447 can crash and then this? Since then having studied most crashes in the last ten years it is quite obvious that the lack of training - I never use the phrase "pilot error" is at the root of this, and moreover it is specifically the ability to fly on instruments in cloud or darkness (with "illusions and "g" forces often mentioned) with multiple failures and completely out of practice - assuming the ever were "in practice". I feel this has to stop and that just adding more automation isn't the solution. It is training.
Cheers