DaveReidUK
I am not suggesting that EASA wasn’t being transparent about the conformal tank design. What I am suggesting is there is a lot riding on getting it approved, as the XLR variant is not viable without it. Since this tank does not meet the certification requirements, other means will be required to mitigate the risks.
Again my point is the PROCESS to evaluate those risks and ascertain what are appropriate mitigation strategies using a apolitical transparent process, is the test to see if the lessons from the MAX tragedy has been learned.
The abject failure by Boeing and the FAA in dealing with a legacy aircraft regulatory non compliance, the inability to meet stick force gradients in some flight configurations, is fundamentally that of a process that should have worked but did not.
Sunlight is the best disinfectant. If Airbus and EASA can go on the record and prove they have used a transparent and thorough process untainted by commercial pressures or regulatory capture, then they can blow off Boeing. If substantial structural changes are now determined to be required to get the tank approved, which IMO is going to be the case then, like it or not Boeing was right.