I think the IEH accident history is a red herring, a series of unconnected failures that don't imply a safety culture issue.
But, the incident where 2 S 76s ended up damaged smacks of complacency, poor awareness and poor piloting - if you can get something as simple as a photo shoot so wrong that is concerning.
Whatever Mr Deetz's issues with the company, they seem largely irrelevant to the Bryant crash and are probably a personality issue of the '6 of one and half a dozen of the other' variety.
What cannot be ignored is that Ara did not comply with the IEH Ops manual which is quite clear on both the weather limits for flight and the actions to be taken in the event of weather deterioration.
If his attitude to the Ops manual was like this habitually, one must question his attitude to other professional aspects of flight such as the UA and IIMC training - was there a cosy relationship in IEH where boxes were ticked to meet the regulations but no actual testing was conducted - a 'handshake currency check' if you will.
Are there sufficient numbers of helicopter guys in the NTSB who understand the difference between the inherent stability of a FW and the inherent instability of RW, especially where IIMC is concerned?