after V1 ...................go baby go baby go
That’s what we teach, train and by and large, what people do. What we’re talking about here is the possibility, small but non-zero, that this time the baby won’t go, or that there is serious evidence that it may not. The statistics appear to show, surprisingly, that we are not as bad as we think in making that judgement call, and that overruns are much more survivable than crashes. Should that change what we normally do approaching V1? No, of course not, but at least we should be aware of the above.
I would be right up there with the critics if this had been a rushed approach with many opportunities to throw it away and have another go; as it was, there was a config warning around V1, taking off hot-and-high from a terrain-constrained airfield. By the time you can positively ascertain what is causing it and how it is going to affect flight (or even allow flight at all), it would be too late, so a decision is required. The conflicting pressures of learnt behaviour in 'V1 must go' vs. 'config warning must stop' (as it will have been almost exclusively trained and experienced at low speed, requiring a stop) shouldn’t be underestimated. We only really find out how we behave in unlikely/unforseen scenarios when they actually happen...