Simulator instructors in the job full time could write a book on what they occasionally witness in the horror box. But the risk of hurt feelings and subsequent danger of litigation are always there. There was one event I saw however, that will forever stick in my mind. The automation was perfect but it was the flight crew handling of an unexpected slight technical defect that was the worry. This event convinced me not only of the pressing need for airline pilots to maintain raw data manual flying competency but of the ever present insidious effect in some countries of ethnic culture when it comes to flight safety mores.
See Post 52.
The Pprune Rumours and News Forum, mentions the FDR from the crashed Sriwijaya Air Boeing 737 Classic was recently located. The Preliminary Report published by the Indonesian regulatory authority confirms the suspicion that an autothrottle malfunction led to a split throttle situation. This defect had been recorded on the same aircraft previously. The CVR is yet to be located but there appears little doubt that the crew subsequently lost control of the aircraft even though the situation should have been easily recoverable. This closely parallels what this writer witnessed during a simulator session several years ago and was described in Post 52 of this thread.
Malfunctions of this type, although seemingly innocuous and even remote, should have been demonstrated in the simulator during type rating training. The usual counter is that malfunctions of this nature are so rare as to be a waste of valuable simulator time . Yet accidents involving autoththrottles and leading to crashes are not new.
During an instructor practice session I was caught by surprise when my colleague demonstrated the effect of a blocked captain's static vent during takeoff and initial climb in the 737 Classic. He didn't warn me. . Everything seemed normal until shortly after liftoff when the captain's altimeter failed to move despite the first officers call of 'Positive Rate of climb' on his altimeter. The captains ASI began a steady reduction of speed, his VSI showed zero rate of clmb but the ground speed agreed with the first officer's ASI reading. The stick shaker sounded as the captains ASI fell back. All these indications were the result of the captain's static vent being blocked. I had never seen this demonstration before during my own type rating training years earlier. I could see the potential for mishandling when faced with such confusing instrument indications at such a critical time on takeoff.
From then I used that experience when conducting type rating training. Then one day when the simulator was not being used, I sat at the instructor panel and explored the many malfunctions on different systems and their indications. Failure of one or both autothrottle clutches at various stages of flight was one such system. It wasn't in the company training syllabus but after seeing for myself how easily a split throttle could lead to a flight path problem if not picked up quickly, I recommended it should be part of type rating training. Fortunately, Ops Management agreed and autothrottle malfunctions were slipped into the syllabus.
In another era I flew long range maritime aircraft on shipping reconnaisance and anti-submarine exercises. There were no simulators in those days so we practiced simulated night ditching hundreds of miles out to sea by laying our own flare path using flame floats and carried out a dummy approach in the ditching configuration and airspeeds. It was only then I realised the importance of good raw data instrument flying skills when we went around again at 500 feet on the radio altimeter. But at least we knew what to expect if ever the worst happened and a ditching was necessary. Keep in mind most of us in the squadron were relatively young and enthusiastic but with nothlng like the thousands of log book hours of airline captains. But we knew how to fly because we had been taught well.
Details for simulator sessions are usually published in each company's operations manual. Training time is limited for cost and scheduling reasons. Same with type rating syllabus. Sequences practiced and tested contain mostly regulatory requirements. Little time is left for practicing rare events such as loss of all engines in flight with their subsequent 'dead stick' landings, ditching on instruments at night, GPWS escape manoevres, go-around on instruments from a big bounce; and dare I add recovery from unusual attitudes following an autothrottle malfunction.
Despite all the regulatory box-ticking, accidents caused by poor flying ability will continue to occur. Sometimes these are culture related accidents. IMHO, the priority in simulator training needs to be away from endless autopilot use wasting an hour on a flight from A to B practicing command management, correct radio calls, lengthy and time consuming checklist reading. I could go on, but mercifully for readers I'd better get off my soap box now
Last edited by Centaurus; 11th Feb 2021 at 00:37.